摘要
企业漂绿行为破坏了社会绿色创新环境,阻碍中国绿色发展进程,成为当前亟待解决的关键问题。文章基于企业异质性视角,首先,在政府的弱监管下,构建以优势企业和劣势企业为博弈主体的两方动态演化博弈模型,分析在市场惩罚下企业的策略选择演化过程及稳定状态;其次,在政府的强监管下,构建政府与异质性企业的三方动态演化博弈模型,分析在政府奖惩下,系统的策略演化过程及稳定状态。通过Matlab模拟分析发现:预期收益直接影响企业的策略选择,企业倾向选择能为其带来较高收益的绿色创新或漂绿策略;弱监管下,企业的异质性比例系数越高,市场惩罚对优势企业漂绿的抑制作用越明显,但对劣势企业却无治理效果;强监管下,政府的适度奖惩对优势企业的漂绿行为有较好的治理效果,但针对异质性企业的无差异奖惩无法治理劣势企业漂绿。因此,政府可以通过明确对不同行业企业的监管重心、激活绿色消费需求、做好顶层制度设计、设计柔性奖惩机制和加强企业社会责任建设等方式,提升监管能力,有效治理企业漂绿。
As a result ofdestroying the social green innovation environment and hindering China's green development process,enterprise greenwashing has become a key problem to be solved urgently.Considering the perspective of firm heterogeneity,firstly,we construct a dynamic evolutionary game model between advantageous enterprises and disadvantageous enterprises under the"weak regulation",in order to analyze the evolution process and stable state of enterprises in the case of market punishment.Secondly,under the"strong supervision",we construct a dynamic evolutionary game model with the government,advantageous enterprises and disadvantageous enterprises,to analyze the strategic evolution process and stable state of the government and heterogeneous enterprises.Through model analysis and simulation with MATLAB,it is found that:first,the expected earnings directly affect the strategic choice of enterprises,that is,enterprises tended to choose green innovation strategies or greenwashing strategies which could bring higher income.Second,under the"weak regulation",the higher the proportion coefficient of firm heterogeneity,the inhibitory effect of market punishment on the greenwashing of superior enterprises is more obvious,but it has no governance effect on inferior enterprises.Third,under the"strong supervision",the government's appropriate rewards and punishments have a good governance effect on the green drift behavior of advantageous enterprises,however,the indifference government rewards and punishments for heterogeneous enterprises can't control the green drift of inferior enterprises.Therefore,we put forward the suggestion that the government should improve the ability of supervision to control the enterprises greenwashing by determining the regulatory focus of enterprises in different industries,activating social green consumption demand,making a top-level design,designing flexible reward and punishment mechanisms and strengthening corporate social responsibility construction.
作者
孙自愿
葛翠翠
张维维
詹子阳
Sun Ziyuan;Ge Cuicui;Zhang Weiwei;Zhan Ziyang
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(L2124032)
国家社科基金后期资助项目(21FGLB017)
江苏省社科基金重大项目(22ZDA005)
江苏高校“青蓝工程”资助(苏教师函[2022]29号)
深圳虚拟大学园机构(智库)资助项目(ZKZZ202308)
江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究项目(2021SJA1175)。
关键词
异质性
漂绿治理
动态演化
市场惩罚
奖惩机制
heterogeneity
greenwashing governance
dynamic evolution
market penalties
mechanism of rewards and punishments
