地方政府激励与社会保险制度改革效果:基于养老保险全国统筹制度设计的研究

Local Governments’Incentives and Effectiveness of Social Insurance System Reform:A Study Based on the Institutional Design of National Pooling of Basic Old-age Insurance Funds

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摘要为缓解区域间城镇职工基本养老保险基金失衡,养老保险全国统筹采用了基金跨省调剂制度。本文发现,由于中央政府与地方政府之间存在信息不对称,跨省调剂制度会改变地方政府的职工基本养老保险征缴规范程度,从而导致企业的职工基本养老保险缴费率下降。由税务部门全责征收职工基本养老保险能有效抑制这一现象,而地方社会保险信息系统接入全国统筹系统的抑制效果较为有限。跨省调剂制度也会使地方政府增加职工基本养老保险基金支出,净调入和净调出地区在职工基本养老保险征缴和基金支出变动上存在异质性。此外,净调入地区放松了非税收入征收力度。本文结论表明,养老保险全国统筹会改变地方政府职工基本养老保险征缴和支出行为,这对职工基本养老保险的征管能力提出了更高要求,从而避免对养老保险基金的长期可持续性造成不利影响。党的二十届三中全会提出,要完善养老保险全国统筹制度,本文可为此提供一定的参考。 To balance the burden of social security funds across regions,the Chinese government established the inter-provincial transfer system for basic old-age insurance funds in 2018.Based on micro-level enterprise data and using the difference-in-differences(DID)method,this study finds that the inter-provincial transfer system leads to a 0.23-percentage-point decrease in the actual contribution rate of enterprises.The collection of social security funds under the full responsibility of tax authorities can effectively curb the decline in the standardization of old-age insurance premium collection,while the entrusted collection by tax authorities has no such effect.In 2022,local old-age insurance information systems were connected to the central information system.However,this paper finds that the decline in the standardization of old-age insurance premium collection still existed after 2022.This study reveals that following the policy implementation,the old-age insurance contribution rate decreases significantly in regions facing high economic development pressure;the decrease in the contribution rate is moderate in regions with low fund balances;and there is no significant decrease in the contribution rate in regions under high fiscal pressure.In addition,the old-age insurance contribution rate decreases in both net-inflow and net-outflow regions,with a larger reduction observed in the latter.This paper also finds that the inter-provincial transfer system further enables local governments to increase their social security fund expenditures and change their non-tax revenue collection behaviors.The marginal contributions of this paper are as follows.(1)It expands the literature on the economic impacts of raising the pooling level of social security.Different from existing studies,which mostly use provincial-level data and data simulation methods to explore the impact of the national pooling system,this paper,by focusing on the inter-provincial transfer of social security funds,examines the behavioral differences between net-inflow and net-outflow regions and finds that inter-provincial transfer of old-age insurance funds increases fund expenditures.(2)It supplements the literature on how changes in local fiscal revenue and expenditure pressure affect the intensity of local governments’non-tax revenue collection.Existing studies mostly focus on the impact of increased fiscal revenue pressure,while this paper analyzes the impact of reduced fiscal revenue pressure.(3)From a broader perspective,it enriches the literature on how fiscal decentralization affects local government behaviors.Existing studies mainly explore the impact of changes in tax sharing ratios on the intensity of local government tax collection.In contrast,this paper finds that changes in the fiscal powers and responsibilities related to social security funds alter local governments’social security collection behaviors,thus expanding the research perspective.

作者唐珏封进赵发强 TANG Jue;FENG Jin;ZHAO Faqiang(School of Public Administration and Policy,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics;Chinese Modernization Institute,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics;School of Economics,Fudan University;Shanghai Institute of International Finance and Economics;Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank;Postdoctoral Mobile Station of Applied Economics,Fudan University)