摘要
传统司法理论认为,刑事司法机关是纵向的“司法等级秩序”与横向的“分工负责、互相配合、互相制约”体系下的“忠实的执法者”。然而,实践并非完全如此,刑事司法机关的一些执法行动具有一定的“自主性”,并通过司法机关之间的互动关系展现出来:一方面,同一系统内部同级司法机关之间展开“锦标赛”式竞争;另一方面,不同系统的同级司法机关之间常常形成有限博弈的“协调型”互动。这种自主性行动的形成源于司法机关有着获取特定组织利益的现实需求,司法机关内部整体利益与局部利益的分化将促使司法机关产生追求特定组织利益的博弈行动。应理性认识司法机关的自主性,通过改进上下级司法机关之间的组织结构,规范司法机关之间的竞争秩序,协调司法机关自主性行动的利益关联,在充分利用司法机关自主性行动机制的正向价值的同时抑制可能的消极影响。
Traditional judicial theory holds that criminal justice organs serve as"faithful law enforcers"within a dual framework consisting of a vertical"judicial hierarchy"and a horizontal system emphasizing"division of responsibilities,mutual coordination,and mutual checks".However,actual practice reveals a divergence:certain law enforcement actions of criminal justice organs exhibit"autonomy",manifested through interactions among judicial organs.On one hand,peer institutions within the same system engage in"tournament-style competition".On the other hand,peer institutions across different systems form"coordinated interactions"characterized by limited gaming.This autonomous behavior stems from the pursuit of specific organizational interests by judicial organs.The differentiation between holistic and partial interests within judicial institutions drives strategic gaming actions.To address this,we must rationally recognize judicial autonomy,improve organizational structures between superior and subordinate judicial organs,regulate competitive order among judicial organs,and coordinate interests in autonomous actions.This approach aims to harness the positive value of judicial autonomous action mechanisms while mitigating potential negative consequences.
出处
《法学评论》
北大核心
2025年第6期18-26,共9页
Law Review
关键词
司法机关
司法自主性
司法组织利益
公检法关系
Judicial Organs
Judicial Autonomy
Judicial Organizational Interest
Relationship among Public Security Organs,Procuratorates,and Courts
