地方公共债务与要素收入分配:效应与机制被引量：1

Local Public Debt and Factor Income Distribution:Effect and Mechanism

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摘要在高质量发展中促进共同富裕是实现中国式现代化的必然要求,理解财政政策对要素收入分配的影响具有重要意义。本文从理论和实证两方面研究了地方公共债务的要素收入分配效应及其作用机制。理论分析显示,地方公共债务扩张可通过要素替代效应和市场结构效应两种机制影响劳动收入份额。要素替代效应体现在,在要素替代弹性小于1的情况下,信贷成本上升会导致单个企业内部劳动收入份额下降。市场结构效应体现在,由于地方公共债务形成的支出具有资本偏向性,地方公共债务扩张会导致资本密集型企业市场份额相对扩张,从而带来地区经济中的劳动收入份额下降。实证分析发现,地方公共债务扩张的确会导致当地劳动收入份额的下降。机制检验表明,地方公共债务对劳动收入份额的负向影响同时来自要素替代效应和市场结构效应,且后者作用更强。本文的研究为通过财政政策优化收入分配和健全宏观经济治理体系提供了参考。 The persistent decline of the labor income share is a global phenomenon that poses significant challenges to inclusive growth and social equity.In China,this trend is particularly concerning as it runs counter to the national strategic goal of common prosperity.Simultaneously,China has witnessed an unprecedented expansion of local government debt,primarily driven by an investment-led growth model,especially since the 2008 global financial crisis.This fiscal behavior is fueled by intense inter-jurisdictional competition and a promotion system rewarding GDP growth.This paper investigates the causal link between these two concurrent trends,asking a critical question:Does the expansion of local public debt contribute to the erosion of the labor income share?We propose and test a dual-mechanism framework.In China’s institutional context,local governments disproportionately channel borrowed funds into capital-intensive infrastructure projects.This“capital-biased”spending impacts the labor share through two distinct channels:(1)a factor substitution effect,where the new public lending crowds out private borrowing,incentivizing firms across the economy to substitute labor for capital when they are complementary for each other;and(2)a resource reallocation effect,where the capitalbiased spending disproportionately benefits the capital-intensive sector,causing the capital-intensive sector which has lower labor income share to acquire larger market share.As the economy’s structure tilts towards the sector with an inherently lower labor share,the aggregate labor income share mechanically declines.To formalize this framework,we develop a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model with two private production sectors:one capital-intensive and one labor-intensive.In this model,the government provides a capital-biased public good(i.e.,infrastructure),financed by debt,which enhances productivity more for capital-intensive firms.The model demonstrates that this public investment triggers both the factor substitution effect within sectors and the resource reallocation effect between them,leading to an unambiguous decline in the aggregate labor income share.We empirically test this hypothesis using a comprehensive panel dataset for China from 2006 to 2017.Employing a robust instrumental variable(IV)approach to address endogeneity,our econometric analysis reveals a significant negative relationship between local government debt and the labor income share.Quantitatively,our baseline estimate suggests that a 10-percentage-point increase in the local government debt-toGDP ratio is associated with a 0.66-percentage-point decline in the labor income share.Further mechanism tests provide evidence for both the factor substitution and resource reallocation channels,confirming that the expenditure’s capital bias,rather than debt financing itself,is the primary driver.This study identifies a novel dual-channel fiscal transmission mechanism linking public debt to factor income distribution,shifting the focus from the financing-side“crowding-out”effect to an expenditure-side“structural bias”effect.Our findings carry profound policy implications.To achieve common prosperity,policymakers must not only manage debt levels but also optimize public expenditure structure.A strategic pivot from purely capital-intensive projects toward more labor-friendly investments,such as human capital and social safety nets,is crucial for fostering a more equitable and sustainable growth path.This highlights a critical trade-off between short-term,investment-led growth and long-term,inclusive development.Therefore,our analysis calls for a reassessment of the performance evaluation criteria for local officials,moving beyond raw GDP metrics to incorporate distributional outcomes.

作者马光荣李紫薇王婕茹聂卓 MA Guangrong;LI Ziwei;WANG Jieru;NIE Zhuo(School of Finance,Renmin University of China;China Financial Policy Research Center,Renmin University of China;Postdoctoral Workstation,China Central Depository and Clearing Co.,Ltd.;China Center for Economic Research,Peking University;National School of Development,Peking University;School of International Trade and Economics,University of International Business and Economics)