摘要
基于2010—2023年中国沪深A股上市企业数据,运用多期DID方法检验中国社会信用体系(CSCS)建设城市试点政策对企业ESG策略性披露行为的治理效应。研究发现,CSCS通过缓解信息不对称程度和增强失信惩戒威慑抑制了企业ESG策略性披露行为,且当地数字经济水平可正向调节该治理效应。异质性分析表明,上述治理效应在非国有企业、环境规制强度大地区及非社会责任敏感型行业的企业中更显著。
Based on data from China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed enterprises from 2010 to 2023,the paper employed a multi-period difference-in-differences(DID)approach to examine the impact of China’s Social Credit System(CSCS)pilot city initiative on corporate strategic ESG disclosure.The findings revealed that the CSCS restrained strategic ESG disclosure by alleviating information asymmetry and strengthening the deterrent effect of discredit penalties.Moreover,the local development of the digital economy positively reinforced this governance effect.Heterogeneity analysis demonstrated that,the effect was more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises,in regions with stringent environmental regulations,and in industries with low social responsibility sensitivity.
作者
荆春棋
李莉
JING Chun-qi;LI Li(School of Politics and Public Administration,Henan Normal University,Xinxiang 453003;Business School,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China)
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
北大核心
2025年第10期115-126,共12页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目(22AGL017)
中国博士后科学基金第74批面上资助项目(2023M741072)
教育部供需对接就业育人项目(2024041920757)
河南省政府决策研究招标课题“关于构建河南科技创新生态模式的研究”(2025JC101)。
关键词
ESG策略性披露
社会信用体系
信息透明度
数字经济
信息不对称
联合奖惩
声誉机制
失信成本
ESG strategic disclosure
social credit system
information transparency
digital economy
information asymmetry
joint rewards and punishments
reputation mechanism
cost of breach of trust
