摘要
证监会2017年实施的《减持新规》强制要求内部人披露减持计划,但是对于计划是否执行或执行多少没有作出明确要求。已有研究发现减持预披露显著限制了我国内部人减持获利能力,但计划执行的弱约束是否留给内部人机会主义的交易空间尚不清楚。文章研究结果验证了这种可能性,即减持计划执行的弱约束给予了内部人利用私有信息赚取超额减持回报的机会。具体而言,当前次减持计划执行不力时,内部人在本次减持计划的交易中获得了显著更高的减持前超额回报;且当前后两次减持计划间隔时间短、公司信息不对称程度高时,该超额回报更为显著。这表明内部人在做出不执行减持计划的决策时很可能已经获取了公司尚未公开的好消息,从而通过披露新的减持计划获得更高的超额回报。进一步研究表明,这一结果无法用股价走势差异、内部人利用公开信息的能力差异等竞争性假说来解释。作为首篇揭示内部人减持计划执行不力动机的研究,文章不仅丰富了内部人交易的研究,而且对完善我国《减持新规》具有直接的借鉴意义。
China's 2017"New Rules on Share Reduction"implemented by the CSRC mandatorily require insiders to disclose reduction plans but impose no explicit requirements on whether or to what extent these plans must be executed.Existing studies have found that pre-disclosure of reduction plans significantly limits insiders'profit-taking ability in China.However,it remains unclear whether the weak enforcement constraints provide room for opportunistic trading by insiders.This study confirms such possibilities:the weak enforcement of reduction plans allows insiders to exploit private information to earn excess returns from share reductions.Specifically,when previous reduction plans were poorly executed,insiders obtained significantly higher pre-reduction excess returns in subsequent reduction plan transactions.These excess returns were more pronounced when the interval between consecutive reduction plans was shorter and when corporate information asymmetry was higher.This suggests that insiders,when opting not to implement their reduction plans,were likely privy to undisclosed positive information,which they subsequently leveraged by announcing new reduction plans to capture higher excess returns.Further analysis shows that these results cannot be explained by alternative hypotheses such as dfferences in stock price trends or insiders'ability to leverage public information.As the first study to reveal the motivations behind insiders'poor execution of reduction plans,this paper not only enriches research on insider trading but also provides direct implications for improving China's"New Rules on Share Reduction".
作者
曾庆生
徐嘉仪
ZENG Qingsheng;XU Jiayi(Institute of Accounting and Finance,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China;School of Accountancy,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China)
出处
《商业经济与管理》
北大核心
2025年第8期91-105,共15页
Journal of Business Economics
基金
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“大数据发展与会计信息契约功能研究”(22JD790093)。
关键词
减持新规
弱约束
减持计划
机会主义减持
New Rules on Share Reduction
weak enforcement constraints
reduction plans
opportunistic selling
