摘要
以税务行政处罚为例,分析财政压力下地方政府非税收入征管行为和特征的变化。结果表明:面对财政压力,地方政府出于缓解财政资源紧张和降低征管成本的双重考量,更倾向于加大处罚金额,而非增大处罚频率,即进行“集约式”而非“广延式”的处罚。金税三期实施、税务行政处罚裁量权行使规则制定以及国地税合并等政策冲击在财政压力对税务处罚的影响中具有增进效果,而在不同程度财政压力和不同类型税务行政处罚组别中,财政压力对税务行政处罚的影响效应呈现明显差异。
Taking administrative penalty revenue from non-tax income as an example,this study analyzes changes in local governments’non-tax revenue collection behaviors and characteristics under fiscal pressure.The results indicate that faced with increasing fiscal pressure,local governments-driven by dual considerations of alleviating fiscal resource constraints and reducing administrative costs-tend to increase penalty amounts rather than penalty frequency,adopting an“intensive”rather than“extensive”approach to enforcement.Policy interventions such as the implementation of the Golden Tax Project Phase III,the formulation of discretionary rules for tax administrative penalties,and the merger of national and local tax bureaus have reinforcing effects on the relationship between fiscal pressure and tax penalties.Moreover,the impact of fiscal pressure on tax administrative penalties shows significant variations across groups with different levels of fiscal pressure and types of tax penalties.
作者
王静
郭劲光
陈程利
WANG Jing;GUO Jinguang;CHEN Chengli(Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025)
出处
《财贸研究》
北大核心
2025年第8期62-78,共17页
Finance and Trade Research
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“促进经济高质量发展的税制结构优化与改革研究”(21&ZD096)。
关键词
财政收入压力
税务行政处罚
非税收入
fiscal revenue pressure
tax administrative penalties
non-tax revenue
