摘要
基于河南省省直管县改革的实践经验,在构建地方政府财政支出行为分析框架的基础上,实证检验地方分权、府际竞争对县域福利性财政支出效率的影响。研究发现:强县扩权模式提高了财政分权程度,但加剧了地方竞争,对福利性财政支出效率产生负向影响;财政省直管模式通过提升财政留成比重显著提高了分权程度,矫正了地方竞争行为,提升了福利性财政支出效率,但全面直管模式没有产生显著的福利效应;在竞争和分权程度较高的市辖县,改革对福利性财政支出效率的负向影响更为显著。
Drawing on the practical experience of Henan Province's Province-Managing-County(PMC)reform,this study developed a local government behavior analytical framework in fisical expenditure to empirically examine how fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental competition affected the efficiency of county-level welfare expenditures.The findings revealed that the county empowerment model enhanced fiscal decentralization but intensified local competition,ultimately impairing welfare expenditure efficiency.The fiscal PMC model significantly improved decentralization through increased local revenue retention rates,effectively corrected competitive distortions,and consequently enhanced welfare spending efficiency.The comprehensive direct administration model demonstrated no statistically significant welfare effects.Notably,the negative effect of the reform was particularly pronounced in municipally administered counties with relatively high levels of competition and decentralization.
作者
顾爽
刘进进
GU Shuang;LIU Jin-jin(School of International Relations and Public Affairs,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China)
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
北大核心
2025年第9期1-14,共14页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社科基金重大研究专项资助课题(22VMG001)。
关键词
省直管县改革
地方政府间竞争
分权改革
行政分权
财政分权
全面扩权
福利性财政支出效率
财政支出结构
Province-Managing-County reform
intergovernmental competition among local governments
decentralization reform
administrative decentralization
financial decentralization
comprehensive empowerment reform
efficiency of welfare fiscal expenditures
fiscal expenditure structure
