摘要
梅洛-庞蒂基于胡塞尔致列维-布留尔的一封信,认为胡塞尔晚年放弃了本质哲学,回到了作为历史事实的现象。对胡塞尔这封信以及同时期相关文本的深入分析表明,这是梅洛-庞蒂对胡塞尔的误解。实际上,尽管胡塞尔肯定了列维-布留尔在人类学作为严格科学问题上的推进,认为其借助同感的方法把握了原始人类的某种“历史的事实”,但始终将之定位为基于现象学意义的人格主义态度的一门纯粹精神科学即现象学人类学,而这只是第二哲学意义上的经验的现象学人类学。对于胡塞尔来说,通过本质变更方法把握“历史的先天”的现象学人类学,才属于第一哲学,它是通往超越论现象学的一条道路。通过对现象学人类学双重意义的分疏,既可以坚持本质哲学,同时也可以建构一门作为事实的总体科学的现象学人类学。
Based on a letter from Husserl to Lévy-Bruhl,Merleau-Ponty argued that in his later years,Husserl abandoned eidetic philosophy and returned to the realm of historical facts as phenomena.However,a close analysis of that letter and related texts from the same period reveals this to be a misunderstanding.While Husserl did acknowledge Lévy-Bruhl's contribution to establishing anthropology as a rigorous science grasping certain"historical facts"of primitive humanity through the method of empathyhe consistently regarded it as a form of phenomenological anthropology rooted in a personalistic attitude,and thus a pure Geisteswissenschaft in the phenomenological sense.This corresponds to an empirical'phenomenological anthropology in the sense of"Second Philosophy."For Husserl,however,phenomenological anthropology that accesses the"historical a priori"through the method of eidetic variation belongs to"First Philosophy"and servesas a path to transcendental phenomenology.By distinguishing between these two meaningsof phenomenological anthropology,we can both preserve eidetic philosophy and construct a general science of factual phenomena through phenomenological anthropology.
出处
《中国社会科学》
北大核心
2025年第8期42-60,205,共20页
Social Sciences in China
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“《马克斯·舍勒全集》翻译与研究”(17ZDA033)阶段性成果。
