摘要
本文关注为何罕有主动公开公益项目失败的现象。基于委托型公益项目中委托方、代理方以及公众监督方相互影响的现实关系,本研究创新性地引入博弈论思维,并在其与质性研究经验的互动中剖析委托型公益项目失败隐藏问题。研究发现:在项目行动主体对公众监督方监督倾向的预期下,缩减的行动序列所蕴含的收益与风险引导项目委托方做出向公众隐藏项目失败的理性选择;委托型公益项目失败隐藏问题的背后并非统一的场景,而是呈现主体纠偏积极性与项目纠偏程度组合的四种类型;推动公众监督方向建设型转变能够有力破解困局,有利于失败项目纠偏。
This paper focuses on why there is little proactive disclosure of philanthropic project failures.Based on the reality of the interplay among the principals,the agents,and the public supervisors in commissioned philanthropic projects,the study innovatively introduces game-theoretic perspective and analyzes the hidden issues surrounding project failure in the interaction with qualitative research experiences.The study finds that:under the expectation of the project actors on the tendency of the public supervisors,the perceived risks and benefits embedded in a reduced sequence of actions guide the principals to make rational choices to hide the failure of the project from the public;there is not a uniform scene behind the failure concealment of commissioned philanthropic projects,but rather,there are four types of characterized by different combinations of actors’engagement in correction and the extent of project-level rectification;promoting the shift of public supervision towards a constructive approach can effectively solve the dilemma and facilitate the correction of failed projects.
出处
《秘书》
2025年第4期48-63,共16页
Secretary
关键词
委托型公益项目
失败隐藏
博弈论
类型分析
公众监督
commissioned philanthropic projects
failure hiding
game theory
type analysis
public supervision
