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优惠券和数字平台价格歧视

Coupons and Digital Platform Price Discrimination
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摘要 本文研究双边平台向新用户提供优惠券而产生的基于购买历史的价格歧视对平台市场竞争和消费者福利的影响。本文使用两阶段动态博弈模型研究横向差异化双寡头双边平台之间的市场竞争。平台为具有异质偏好的卖家和消费者提供服务。平台可以选择是否在第二期统一价格的基础上为新加入的消费者提供优惠券形式的价格折扣。相对于针对所有用户进行统一定价的方案,基于购买历史的价格歧视策略会在第一期弱化平台在消费者一侧的平台价格竞争,而在第二期则加剧消费者一侧的平台价格竞争。因此,基于购买历史的价格歧视策略降低双边平台利润,提高消费者剩余。本文也考虑了在消费者短视的市场环境中基于购买历史的价格歧视对平台竞争的影响。研究表明,短视的消费者并不能增加平台利润,反而会降低平台利润。消费者的外生性转移成本会提高第二期的平台消费者价格和平台为新用户提供的价格折扣额度,从而导致转换平台的消费者减少。相较于统一定价策略,在消费者具有外生性转移成本情形下,平台实行基于购买历史的价格歧视策略增加平台利润。 This paper studies the effects of behavior⁃based price discrimination(BBPD)on platform competition and consumer welfare.We use a two⁃period dynamic setting to study the duopolistic competition between horizontally differentiated platforms.The platforms provide services to heterogeneous sellers and consumers.The platforms can choose whether to offer new consumers coupons as discounts on prices in the second period.Compared to a uniform pricing scheme,offering new consumers price discounts in the second period softens price competition on consumers'side in the first period and intensifies price competition on the same side in the second period.Therefore,it reduces platform profits and increases consumer surplus.We also consider the effects of BBPD on platform competition in a market with myopic consumers.Our results show that consumer myopia leads to lower platform profits.If consumers incur exogenous switching costs when they switch from one platform to the other,the platforms charge a higher consumer price in the second period and offer a larger discount to new consumers,and consequently fewer consumers switch platforms.Compared to the uniform pricing scheme,offering new consumers price discounts in the second period leads to higher platform profits when consumers incur switching costs.
作者 孙可可 徐静 SUN Keke;XU Jing(Center for Industrial and Business Organization of Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116012,China;School of Public Finance and Taxation of Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China)
出处 《产业组织评论》 2024年第2期85-100,共16页 Industrial Organization Review
基金 辽宁省教育厅高校基本科研项目面上项目:“平台优惠券:双边平台内生性转移成本”(LJKR0449) 东北财经大学校级科研项目一般项目“转换成本视角下的双边市场价格歧视研究”(DUFE2020Y16)
关键词 双边平台 大数据杀熟 优惠券 转移成本 two⁃sided platforms behavior⁃based price discrimination coupons switching costs
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