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基于非合作讨价还价博弈的医养结合PPP项目收益分配研究

Research on profit distribution of PPP projects combining medical care andelderly care based on the non-cooperative bargaining game
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摘要 针对日益严峻的人口老龄化问题,医养结合型养老服务逐渐受到广泛关注,而公私合作模式(public-private partnership,PPP)为引入民间资本、提升服务质量提供了有效途径.然而,收益分配不均影响了合作的稳定性与项目的可持续发展.为此,基于非合作讨价还价博弈理论,构建了政府、医疗机构和养老机构三方收益分配模型.博弈分为两个阶段:第一阶段,较弱的两方结成联盟,与较强的一方轮流讨价还价;第二阶段,联盟内部轮流讨价还价分配均衡收益.通过算例验证模型有效性,并分析风险分担比例、努力水平系数和合作贡献度对收益分配的影响.结果表明:政府和医疗机构的收益受风险分担比例和努力水平系数影响最大,养老机构的收益受风险分担比例与合作贡献度的影响最大,说明提出优化PPP项目收益分配的策略建议,推动医养结合项目的有效应用. In response to the growing problem of population aging,the combination of medical care and elderly care services is gradually receiving widespread attention.The public-private partnership(PPP)model is an effective way to introduce private capital and innovate senior care services.However,the unequal distribution of benefits affects the stability of the cooperation and the project's sustainability.So,this study uses the non-cooperative bargaining game theory to construct a tripartite revenue-sharing model including the government,medical care organizations,and elderly care organizations.The game process is divided into two stages:in the first stage,the weaker parties form a coalition and take turns bargaining with the stronger party;in the second stage,the parties within the alliance take turns bargaining to distribute the equilibrium revenue.The arithmetic example verifies the validity of the model,and the influence of the risk sharing ratio,effort level coefficient,and cooperation contribution degree on the distribution of benefits of each party is analyzed.The results indicate that the government and medical care organizations'benefits are most significantly affected by the risk-sharing ratio and the effort level coefficient,while the risk-sharing ratio and the cooperation contribution degree influence most significantly the benefits of elderly care organizations.Based on this,this paper proposes strategic suggestions to optimize the distribution of benefits from PPP projects and promote the effective application of projects combining medical care and elderly care,reflecting the innovative and practical significance of the research.
作者 曹永燕 李鹏 肖燕 徐志伟 CAO Yongyan;LI Peng;XIAO Yan;XU Zhiwei(School of Economics and Management,Jiangsu University of Science and Technology,Zhenjiang 212100,China;School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 211106,China)
出处 《江苏科技大学学报(自然科学版)》 2025年第4期62-71,共10页 Journal of Jiangsu University of Science and Technology:Natural Science Edition
基金 国家社会科学基金项目(22AGL032)。
关键词 医养结合 PPP项目 收益分配 讨价还价博弈 combination of medical care and elderly care PPP project profit distribution bargaining game
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