摘要
发展新能源汽车产业已经成为国家战略、社会共识,对实现碳中和目标具有重要意义。新能源汽车召回是推进产业发展的重要一环,破解软硬件系统信息不对称是完善召回流程的关键。本文认为,政府调查和公众监督的有效性会影响制造商的策略选择;另外,强调新能源汽车制造商责任意识能够实现政府调查和公众监督下的自主召回理想状态。本文构建基于信息不对称性下的新能源汽车制造商、政府、公众之间的三方演化博弈模型,并对三方策略选择进行动态仿真分析。结果表明:(1)制造商采取“主动召回”策略将有利于其长期目标的实现;(2)政府作为新能源汽车市场监管主体,对制造商不能“一罚了之”,采取调查策略是降低市场信息不对称性的关键;(3)公众作为有限理性主体,参与监督是其最优选择;(4)与传统的政府主导监管模式相比,公众参与监管下,制造商实施自主召回策略的意愿显著增强。本文的研究成果可为降低召回过程的信息不对称性、促进新能源汽车产业可持续发展提供理论参考。
The development of new energy automobile industry has become a national strategy and social consensus,which is of great significance in promoting regional economic development,economic structure transformation and upgrading,and reaching the goal of“double carbon”.Intelligent and networked new energy vehicles have brought convenience and speed to travel,and more and more consumers have begun to favor new energy vehicles.However,with the increasing penetration of new energy vehicles,new energy vehicles relying on complex hardware and software systems are prone to quality defects,and like traditional fuel vehicles,new energy vehicles are also facing the problem of defective product recalls.Compared with traditional fuel vehicles,new energy vehicles have a higher degree of intelligent networking.Complex hardware and software systems give new energy vehicle manufacturers an absolute information advantage,both in the automotive market and in the recall process.New energy vehicle manufacturers can gain excessive returns through information asymmetry,while uninformed vehicle owners suffer losses.Reducing information asymmetry in the recall process is essential for the sustainable development of the new energy vehicle industry.Manufacturer-initiated recalls can minimize information asymmetry,but they also face high recall costs,and in the absence of external monitors,manufacturers will choose to conceal information about quality defects.However,existing studies mainly focus on the study of manufacturers′behavior in the recall process,and the game relationship between parties in the automotive recall process has rarely been mentioned.Therefore,this study combines finite rationality and information asymmetry to study the recall process in the new energy vehicle market,and proposes effective measures to reduce information asymmetry and promote the sustainable development of the new energy vehicle industry.the first part,the current situation of the new energy vehicle industry,the background of the study and the general framework are introduced.In the second part,the interests of each recall participating subject are analyzed.In the third part,firstly,taking information asymmetry as the entry point,a three-party evolutionary game model involving manufacturers,government and the public is constructed.Secondly,the three-party benefit matrix is calculated,the strategy game phase diagram is constructed,and the model is solved and the corresponding conclusions are obtained.Further,the three-party evolutionary dynamics system is established,and the equilibrium strategy analysis is based on Jacobian matrix to obtain the stability conditions of the equilibrium point.Finally,four possible evolutionary paths in the initial stage,developmental stage and maturity stage are simulated.In the fourth part,numerical simulation is used to explore the evolution paths of the system under different combinations of initial strategies,and sensitivity analysis is conducted on the efforts of the government and the public to reduce information asymmetry.In the fifth part,the research conclusions of this paper are drawn and policy recommendations are made.The following conclusions and managerial insights are obtained from this study.I.Manufacturers consider strategy selection more from a cost-benefit perspective,and only if it is more in line with the long-term profitability of new energy vehicle manufacturers,manufacturers will choose active recall strategies to reduce market information asymmetry.The main purpose of government regulation is to guide manufacturers to initiate recalls.Whether or not the public participates in the regulation depends on the asymmetric information in the market,and the public will participate in the regulation when the public interest is jeopardized.Manufacturers should focus on brand building,abandon short-term thinking,and aim for capital market returns and long-term market returns as the goal of corporate development.The government should focus on guiding rather than penalizing,and support the development of the new energy vehicle industry by providing incentives instead of penalties,with industry support and policy support as the main focus.The public should actively defend their rights and voice their opinions,respond to quality defects to the regulatory authorities,safeguard their rights and interests,and reduce market information asymmetry.In conclusion,this study uses the theory of finite rationality to construct an evolutionary game model to study the information asymmetry in the recall process of new energy vehicles,which provides a new idea for the regulation of new energy vehicle recalls,and the conclusions obtained can provide a theoretical basis for the healthy development of the new energy vehicle industry.
作者
洪瑶瑶
魏玖长
田晶晶
HONG Yaoyao;WEI Jiuchang;TIAN Jingjing(School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China;School of Public Affairs,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China;Samr Defective Product Recall Technical Center,Beijing 100101,China)
出处
《管理工程学报》
北大核心
2025年第5期214-231,共18页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
中国标准化研究院院长基金项目(282023Y-10409、282022Y-9461)
国家自然科学基金项目(72293573)。
关键词
三方演化博弈
信息不对称
新能源汽车召回
软硬件系统
数值仿真
Three-way evolutionary game
Information asymmetry
New energy vehicle recalls
Software and hardware system
Numerical simulation
