摘要
环境分权带来的环境事务管理权下沉使地方政府具有一定的能力对辖区污染企业提供“地方保护”以保证税收收益,这不仅会阻碍经济发展转型,还阻碍了非污染企业的进入和市场活力的提升。那么,环保管理体制如何改革才能转变地方政府对污染企业的依赖,吸引非污染企业进入呢?文章以“省以下环保机构监测监察执法垂直管理制度改革试点”的实施为准自然实验,对环境从属地管理到垂直管理制度变化过程中,地方政府和环保部门的行为逻辑与企业进入策略变迁进行理论分析,并使用双重差分模型评估了环保垂直管理制度改革对企业进入的影响。研究发现,垂直管理改革显著影响了企业进入,但这种影响具有异质性,表现为对污染企业进入的抑制效应和非污染企业进入的促进效应;机制检验表明,改革对于企业进入异质性的影响源于政府引资努力的提高、市场一体化进程的加速和绿色需求创造效应的发挥;拓展性分析发现,改革对市际边界效应和省际边界效应较强地区的非污染企业进入产生了更为显著的影响,同时有效改变了污染企业向省内城市边界地区集聚的模式;此外,改革优化了外资企业进入结构,改善了外资的“污染避难所效应”。文章的研究从微观企业进入视角,为我国深入推进地方环保管理体制改革,协同推进经济高质量发展和生态环境保护提供了经验证据。
Under China’s fiscal decentralization system and the GDP-oriented performance evaluation mechanism,local governments possess strong incentives to attract enterprises for tax base cultivation.Concurrently,environmental decentralization has devolved environmental governance authority to local governments,enabling them to provide“local protectionism”for polluting enterprises through administrative resources to secure fiscal revenues.This institutional arrangement perpetuates reliance on extensive development models,exacerbates market fragmentation,and hinders the entry of non-polluting enterprises while suppressing market vitality.Therefore,how should the environmental management system be restructured to transition from pollution-dependent development patterns and effectively attract non-polluting enterprises?Using the data of Chinese industrial and commercial enterprise registration from 2009 to 2019 and a DID approach,this paper analyzes the impact of the vertical management system reform of environmental agencies below the provincial level on firm entry.It is found that the reform has a significant impact on firm entry,but the impact is heterogeneous,which is manifested as the inhibiting effect on the entry of polluting enterprises and the promoting effect on the entry of non-polluting enterprises.Mechanism testing attributes this to enhanced investment promotion efficiency,accelerated market integration,and activated green demand effects.Extended findings demonstrate that the reform has a more significant impact on the entry of non-polluting enterprises in cities with a strong border effect,and it is also conducive to changing the pattern of more polluting enterprises congregating in urban border areas in the province.The contributions of this paper are as follows:First,it extends environmental federalism debates by investigating how China’s vertical management system reform of environmental agencies affects firm entry,addressing persistent scholarly disputes over decentralized vs centralized environmental regulation efficacy.Second,it enriches the firm entry literature through the lens of the institutional design of local environmental governance,contrasting this fundamental and systematic restructuring of power allocation and accountability mechanisms between governments and environmental agencies with temporary environmental initiatives characterized by ad-hoc institutional arrangements and ex-post supervision-oriented approaches.Third,it systematically reveals causal mechanisms between regulatory restructuring and firm entry patterns by analyzing behavioral interactions among local governments,environmental agencies,and corporations,offering policy insights for optimizing vertical management frameworks to enhance environmental oversight and economic vitality.
作者
何凌云
余传曦
He Lingyun;Yu Chuanxi(School of Economics,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China)
出处
《财经研究》
北大核心
2025年第5期140-154,共15页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(20FJLB023)
国家社会科学基金一般项目(24BJL019)。
关键词
环保管理体制
垂直管理
企业进入
异质性
environmental management system
vertical management
firm entry
heterogeneity
