摘要
在深入实施创新驱动发展战略的现阶段,充分激励作为科技创新主体的企业创新至关重要。本文通过构建一个包含商业银行与实体企业的两期理论模型,并将《关于规范金融机构同业业务的通知》出台视为一项准自然实验,系统考察银行同业业务监管如何影响企业创新。理论分析表明,银行同业业务监管强化会降低其负债端的流动性风险并提升其持有信贷资产的意愿,这将引致长期信贷供给的增加,进而激励实体企业开展更多研发创新活动。双重差分估计为理论命题提供了因果证据,而且该结论在排除处理变量非随机分布以及其他同时期政策冲击的影响后依旧成立。进一步的机制检验发现,银行同业业务监管强化会增加其长期贷款投放,促使实体企业获取更多长期银行借款并得以扩大研发投入。特别地,在研发密集型和长期资金缺口严重的企业以及政企融资竞争弱和创新环境好的地区,上述创新激励效应更为凸显。此外,伴随着创新数量的增加,企业创新质量和创新效率得到提升,最终有利于促进企业生产效率提升和盈利水平提高。本文结论表明,强化银行同业业务监管有助于优化企业创新融资环境,这对于实现创新驱动型经济增长模式具有重要的政策启示。
A critical challenge for policymakers is how to effectively stimulate corporate innovation,which is essential for transitioning to an innovation-driven economic growth model in the new development stage.However,innovation activities are characterized by high uncertainty and a long incubation cycle,necessitating long-term financial support.Internally generated cash flows are often insufficient,so external financing,particularly long-term bank credit,plays a decisive role in the success of corporate innovation.The ability of banks to provide long-term credit to the real economy depends on the stability of their funding.However,after the global financial crisis in 2008,China's banking industry increasingly favored interbank business,absorbing a large amount of wholesale funds through interbank liabilities,and concentrating the allocation of"quasi-credit"interbank assets in local financing platforms and real estate enterprises.To mitigate financial risks and redirect capital toward the real economy,the People's Bank of China and other four departments jointly issued the Notice on Regulating the Interbank Business of Financial Institutions,strengthening the supervision of interbank business of banks.This regulation reduces banks'reliance on interbank liabilities on the liability side and enhances the stability of banks'liability.It also discourages the holding of interbank assets,thereby alleviating the crowdingout effect on conventional bank credit.These dual mechanisms expand the long-term credit supply of commercial banks and facilitate corporate innovation.To verify the above theoretical inferences,this paper constructs a two-period model involving commercial banks and enterprises and examines how interbank business regulation affects corporate innovation.Theoretical analysis indicates that the strengthened supervision of interbank businesses reduces interbank liabilities and interbank assets,and encourages them to issue long-term credit.The increase in long-term credit supply incentivizes enterprises to increase R&D activities.The subsequent difference-in-differences(DID)estimation supports our theoretical proposition.Further mechanism tests reveal that the strengthened supervision of the interbank business of banks significantly increases banks'long-term loan issuance,prompting enterprises to obtain more long-term loans and expand their R&D investment.In particular,the innovation incentive effect is more pronounced in firms that are R&D-intensive and have severe long-term capital gaps,and in regions with weak competition in government-firm financing and a favorable innovation environment.Further analysis reveals that the policy-induced increase in innovation output is accompanied by significant improvements in the quality and efficiency of corporate innovation,which is ultimately conducive to promoting corporate production efficiency and profitability level.The contributions of this paper are as follows.First,this paper uses the DID to identify the causal relationship between interbank business regulation and corporate innovation,and evaluates the microeconomic effect of the regulation of interbank business.Second,this paper investigates mechanisms of corporate innovation underinvestment and emphasizes that the long-term credit supply adjustment caused by the strengthening of interbank business regulation has an important impact on corporate innovation.Third,different from previous literature focusing on relationships between bank credit and firm innovation in terms of risk and return,credit size,and over-indebtedness,this paper investigates the importance of debt maturity for firm innovation.
作者
刘贯春
王琪红
陈肖雄
张军
LIU Guan-chun;WANG Qi-hong;CHEN Xiao-xiong;ZHANG Jun(Lingnan College,Sun Yat-sen University;Institute of Mezzoeconomics,Sun Yat-sen University;School of Economics and Management,Southwestern University;School of Economics,Fudan University)
出处
《中国工业经济》
北大核心
2025年第7期119-137,共19页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“地方财政压力的区域性银行发展效应与货币政策传导效应研究”(批准号72373169)
国家自然科学基金青年项目“税收征管数字化的资源配置效应与税制优化设计研究”(批准号72403210)
广东省自然科学基金杰出青年项目“信息技术进步背景下的财税治理现代化研究”(批准号2025B1515020080)。
关键词
银行同业业务监管
企业创新
长期信贷供给
interbank business regulation
corporate innovation
long-term credit supply
