摘要
建立并完善个人信用体系是近年来中国推进市场诚信建设、降低金融风险的重要举措。本研究与一家大型P2P网贷平台合作开展自然实地实验,考察了债务豁免以及债务豁免与信用信息共享相结合的两类催收措施对长期违约者小额信贷还款行为的影响。结果表明:两种干预均能显著提高还款概率,但对还款金额的提升作用有限。在债务豁免的基础上引入信用信息共享措施,对违约金额较大的借款人的还款概率具有更稳健的提升效果。结合理论模型进一步发现,惩罚性干预挤出了违约者的内在还款动机,削弱了激励效果,因此,应根据违约者特征慎重选择干预措施。研究结果为理解小额信贷市场“逃废债”乱象、完善信用体系和优化催收措施提供经验支持与理论参考。
Microcredit has long served as a pivotal instrument for advancing financial inclusion and alleviating global poverty,particularly through the empowerment of vulnerable populations and the stimulation of economic growth.Nevertheless,persistently high default rates-driven in part by borrowers'moral hazard-continue to impede its expansion.This challenge is particularly pronounced within the internet-based peer-to-peer(P2P)lending model.In response,since 2019,Chinese regulatory authorities have permitted P2P platforms to integrate with the national credit information sharing system-commonly referred to as the"credit reporting system"-to reduce defaults through enhanced information transparency.Yet robust empirical evidence on the efficacy of such credit-reporting measures in influencing borrowers'repayment behaviour remains scarce.To address this evidence gap,this study collaborated with a major nationwide P2P lending platform in China to conduct a natural field experiment assessing the effectiveness of distinct loan recovery strategies among long-term defaulters.A sample of 4,500 delinquent borrowers was randomly allocated to one of three experimental conditions:(1)a control treatment-wherein no incentives were provided and borrowers retained full liability for their outstanding debts;(2)a reward treatment-offering partial debt forgiveness conditional on repayment within the one-month intervention period;and(3)a reward+punishment treatment-which combined the debt forgiveness incentive with an additional stipulation that failure to repay the reduced amount within the specified period would trigger reporting of their delinquency status to the credit reporting system.Guiding this experiment,a theoretical framework distinguishes between borrowers'intrinsic motivation to comply with repayment norms and the extrinsic deterrence effect of credit reporting,while accounting for potential crowding-out effects between these mechanisms.The formal model yields two principal predictions:first,that debt forgiveness enhances repayment willingness among defaulters;and second,that the net effect of credit information sharing depends critically on whether the extrinsic deterrent effect either complements or undermines intrinsic motivation.Consistent with the first prediction,experimental evidence demonstrates that repayment rates in the reward and reward+punishment treatments increase to 1l-fold and 6-fold levels relative to the control treatment,respectively,indicating that both interventions significantly enhance repayment willingness.However,the deterrent effect of credit reporting partially counteracts the benefits of debt forgiveness,revealing a crowding-out effect on intrinsic motivation.For borrowers with substantial outstanding balances,the incorporation of credit reporting alongside debt forgiveness yields a more robust repayment effect.In terms of repayment amounts,the average repayment in the reward and reward+punishment treatments rises to 7-fold and 1.5-fold the control treatment level,respectively,though these differences lack statistical significance due to considerable sample variance.These findings make three principal contributions.Theoretically,they represent the first identification of crowding-out effects in a borrowing context and elucidate how this phenomenon informs the optimal design of policy instruments.Methodologically,the research employs a large-scale field experiment conducted in collaboration with a nationwide P2P platform,with randomisation occurring after borrowers had entered long-term default-a design that enables more precise identification of treatment effects on moral hazard.Practically,the investigation focuses on a high-risk borrower population that aligns with contemporary policy priorities for credit system reform,yielding actionable insights for policymakers,enhancing credit infrastructure and refining debt collection methodologies.
作者
翁茜
马迪
闫瑾
何浩然
Weng Qian;Ma Di;Yan Jin;He Haoran
出处
《世界经济》
北大核心
2025年第8期203-232,共30页
The Journal of World Economy
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究基金(21YJA790059)
国家自然科学基金(72273148、72473010和72131003)的资助。
关键词
小额信贷
贷款偿还
债务豁免
信用信息共享
挤出效应
实地实验
microcredit
loan repayment
debt forgiveness
credit information sharing
crowd-out effect
field experiment
