摘要
全球最具影响力的商业巨头正日益承担起监管其他企业的公共职能。受行政机关强制指令的约束,Facebook公司需要监控应用程序开发商的隐私保护机制;花旗银行需要核查旗下的客户呼叫中心是否存在欺诈性销售行为;埃克森美孚石油公司需要审查海上石油平台的环境标准。学术界长期关注政策制定者如何运用私人市场主体作为公共执法力量,如认证机构、会计师、律师等外围“看门人”。但他们鲜少探讨经济核心领域中大型私营企业被系统性用作监管工具这一新兴趋势。文章通过对科技、金融、能源、制药等支柱产业的案例研究,揭示了大型私营企业作为公共政策执行者日益崛起的现象。过去20年间,行政机关依据立法规范、指导文件和司法命令,强制要求这些行业的龙头企业履行公共监管职责。具体而言,企业须在商业合约中明确规定保留对第三方进行审查的条款,以此确保当发现第三方违规行为时它们能够对其施加压力或采取惩戒措施。这种治理模式具有重要的理论创新价值及政策启示:它不仅赋予企业更多公共责任、重塑公司治理结构,甚至可能引发商业组织形态的深层次变革,同时也为资源有限的监管部门提供了前景广阔的监管工具。但若制度设计失当,作为公共政策执行者的私营企业可能产生大量缺乏问责机制的问题。在当代企业与规制的理论研究中,学者应对私营企业作为公共执法者的现象给予足够重视。
The world’s largest businesses must routinely police other businesses.By public mandate,Facebook monitors App developers’privacy safeguards,Citibank audits call centers for deceptive sales practices,and Exxon reviews offshore oil platforms’environmental standards.Scholars have devoted significant attention to how policy makers deploy other private sector enforcers,such as certification bodies,accountants,lawyers,and other periphery“gatekeepers”.However,the literature has yet to explore the emerging regulatory conscription of large firms at the center of the economy.This Article examines the rise of the enforcer-firm through case studies of the industries that are home to the most valuable companies,in technology,banking,oil,and pharmaceuticals.Over the past two decades,administrative agencies have used legal rules,guidance documents,and court orders to mandate that private firms in these and other industries perform the duties of a public regulator.More specifically,firms must write rules in their contracts that reserve the right to inspect third parties.When they find violations,they must pressure or punish the wrongdoer.This form of governance has important intellectual and policy implications.It imposes more of a public duty on the firm,alters corporate governance,and may even reshape business organizations.It also gives resource-strapped regulators promising tools.If designed poorly,however,the enforcer-firm will create an expansive area of unaccountable authority.Any comprehensive account of the firm or regulation must give a prominent role to the administrative state’s newest gatekeepers.
作者
林慰曾(译)
Rory Van Loo;LIN Weizeng
出处
《经贸法律评论》
2025年第4期122-158,共37页
Business and Economic Law Review
关键词
私营企业
看门人
合同治理
企业责任
公共治理
Private Firm
Gatekeeper
Rule by Contract
Corporate Responsibility
Public Governance
