摘要
本文考察债权激励对公司再融资决策的影响。运用动态规划和随机控制理论,构建连续时间增长期权模型,并计算出公司证券风险中性价值和最优再融资策略。通过理论推导和数值模拟,本文得到以下结论:第一,债权激励能有效缓解公司再融资扭曲程度,提高企业投资理性,弥补再融资监管不足;第二,薪酬结构包含债权激励可向外界传递良好信号,缓解管理者与债权人之间的代理冲突,降低公司再融资成本,提高公司再融资效率;第三,债权激励能减缓高杠杆公司再融资后的债务积压问题,但对低杠杆公司的作用却相反。本文的研究为探究高管债权激励提升企业再融资效率的作用机制提供理论依据。
It is a critical way to promote the high-quality development of enterprises by promoting the efficient corporate financing and investment.Facing the refinancing chaos,external supervision is costly and inefficient.It is urgent to find an endogenous mechanism to induce managers make efficient investment and financing deci⁃sions spontaneously.In the real world,companies with inside debt(i.e.,pensions and deferred compensation)have fared well during big shocks to the market economy,such as the 2008 financial crisis and COVID-19.However,the existing literature on inside debt mainly focuses on its impact on corporate risk-taking or initial capital structure,and does not use dynamic model to analyze the impact of inside debt on corporate refinancing.Using dynamic programming and stochastic control theory,a continuous-time growth option model is constructed to investigate the impact of inside debt on corporate refinancing.By using the backward recursive method,the risk-neutral value of each stakeholder before and after refinancing,and firm optimal refinancing strategy is calculated.Through theoretical derivation and numerical simulation,we have following three conclu⁃sions.Firstly,inside debt can effectively alleviate the distortion of corporate refinancing,improve the rational⁃ity of corporate investment,and make up for the lack of refinancing supervision.Secondly,executive compensa⁃tion structure containing inside debt can send a good signal to the creditors,alleviate the agency conflict between managers and creditors,reduce the company's refinancing cost,and improve the company's refinancing efficiency.Thirdly,inside debt can mitigate the debt overhang problem after refinancing for high leverage firms,but have the opposite effect on low leverage firms.Inside debt promotes managers'rational investment and makes up for the inefficiency of refinancing supervision.
作者
赵志明
潘琼
Zhao Zhiming;Pan Qiong(Business School,Xiangtan University,Xiangtan 411105,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
北大核心
2025年第6期27-36,共10页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
湖南省自然科学基金项目(2024JJ5386)
国家自然科学基金项目(71801185,72171207)。
关键词
债权激励
再融资
债务积压
代理冲突
inside debt
refinancing
debt overhang
agency conflict
