摘要
针对“链长制”下产业链协同创新的长期性、动态性特征,考虑公平偏好与声誉因素,采用微分博弈方法,对分散决策模式、链主企业成本分担模式、集中决策模式3种情景下的最优创新决策进行比较分析。结果表明:在分散决策模式下,产业链声誉水平和系统总收益最低,实现产业链协同创新的最优策略是集中决策、合作发展;双方公平偏好会影响链主企业的成本分担比例,当双方均具中等公平偏好且成本分担比例超出临界点时,链主企业收益将随成本分担比例的增加而降低;公平感的存在对双方创新努力行为具有抑制作用,对产业链声誉和总收益产生不利影响;政府补贴比例越高对声誉及总收益的提升作用越明显,但其激励效果在后期会逐渐减弱。基于此,建议链主企业构建合理的成本分担机制,在促进产业链协同创新的过程中,应重视公平感对创新行为及收益可能产生的抑制效应;作为链长的政府需提升创新监测的敏感性,动态调整激励政策以保障合理性与有效性。
The chain chief system is an institutional arrangement with Chinese characteristics,designed to designate responsible entities for key links in the industrial chain,coordinate upstream and downstream resource allocation,and thereby promote the coordinated development and technological innovation of regional industrial systems,ultimately achieving high-quality extension and upgrading of industrial chains.In view of the long-term and dynamic nature of collaborative innovation under the chain chief system,this study incorporates fairness preferences and reputation considerations into the analysis.Using a differential game framework,it compares the optimal innovation strategies across three governance scenarios:decentralized decision-making,cost-sharing by the lead firm,and centralized coordination.The results indicate that under the decentralized decision-making scenario,both the reputation level of the industrial chain and the overall system payoff are the lowest,the optimal strategy for achieving collaborative innovation lies in centralized coordination and joint development;fairness preferences of both parties influence the cost-sharing ratio assumed by the lead firm,when both parties exhibit moderate fairness preferences and the costsharing ratio exceeds a certain threshold,the lead firm's payoff declines as the cost burden increases;moreover,the presence of fairness concerns tends to suppress the innovation efforts of both parties,adversely affecting the industrial chain's reputation and total payoff,while government subsidies can enhance both reputation and system returns,the marginal incentive effect of such subsidies diminishes over time.Based on these findings,it is recommended that lead firms establish a rational cost-sharing mechanism and pay close attention to the potential suppressive effects of fairness concerns on innovation efforts and returns in the process of promoting collaborative innovation along the industrial chain;as the chain coordinator,the government should enhance the sensitivity of innovation monitoring and dynamically adjust incentive policies to ensure their rationality and effectiveness.
作者
胡斌
常思雨
Hu Bin;Chang Siyu(School of Management,Shanghai University of Engineering Science,Shanghai 201620,China)
出处
《科技管理研究》
2025年第10期193-206,共14页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目“整合式创新视角下战略性新兴产业融合集群发展的动态路径研究”(23AGL003)。
关键词
产业链
链长制
协同创新
微分博弈
公平偏好
声誉
industrial chains
chain chief system
collaborative innovation
differential game
fair preference
reputation
