摘要
近年来,上市公司中出现了无控股股东现象。无控股股东时,高管的薪酬契约和相应的薪酬差距会发生怎样的变化,少有文献涉及该问题。利用手工收集的无控股股东数据,本文分析了无控股股东和高管薪酬差距的关系。研究发现,无控股股东与高管薪酬差距存在正相关的关系。利用中介效应模型,本文分析了无控股股东与高管薪酬差距正相关关系的原因,发现高管权力能够解释这一正相关关系,而晋升锦标赛理论并不能解释该关系,同时发现当前两大股东股权接近、高管声誉高、董事会规模大时,高管利用权力扩大薪酬差距更严重。在治理机制分析中发现,股权激励能够发挥治理作用,显著抑制无控股股东对高管薪酬差距的正向作用;法律保护也能发挥治理作用,抑制二者关系。研究结论为研究无控股股东下的高管薪酬契约制定提供了经验证据,扩展了高管薪酬差距的相关研究,也为我们完善无控股股东下公司治理提供新的思路。
In recent years,companies disclose the absence of controlling shareholders.When there is no controlling shareholders,it is worthy of studying what would happen for the managerial compensation contract and the pay gap between managers.Using data of the absence of controlling shareholders',this paper study the relationship between absence of controlling shareholders and managerial pay gap.The results show that there is positive relationship between absence of controlling shareholders and pay gap.And this positive relationship can be attributed to managerial power.In the further analysis,this paper also finds that the current two major shareholders'equity is close,the senior management with high reputation and the board of directors is large,the use of power to pursue private interests is more serious.In the analysis of governance mechanism,this paper finds that the ownership incentive can play a governance role,and significantly inhibit the positive effect of non-controlling shareholders on the executive compensation gap;legal protection can play a governance role too.The results of this study,offer empirical evidence on the management compensation contract designing,widen the research on pay gap and give us new insight of corporate governance in the background of absence of controlling shareholders.
作者
章琳一
吴沁霖
张洪辉
ZHANG Linyi;WU Qinlin;ZHANG Honghui
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
北大核心
2025年第7期111-125,共15页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
基金
江西省社会科学基金项目“营商环境优化、企业迁入与当地经济增长”(项目编号:23YJ11)。
关键词
无控股股东
薪酬差距
晋升锦标赛
高管权力
Absence of controlling shareholders
Pay gap
Tournament
Managerial power
