摘要
工业用地出让价格竞争是中国地方政府间横向竞争的典型特征。中央政府利用城市群批复的行政权在跨行政区域层面调整了地方政府的竞争激励,重新塑造了地方政府的工业用地出让行为。本文利用全国281个地级及以上城市2007—2020年面板数据,研究了城市群批复对工业用地价格竞争的影响。结果表明:(1)基准回归发现,在地理邻近设定下,城市群批复缓解了地方政府间工业用地出让价格竞争,且估计结果在变更代理变量、城市群批复时间、空间权重矩阵后依然稳健。(2)路径分析发现,城市群批复产生的行政与市场红利可以表现为城市群内制造业区位熵与工业企业占比的显著提升,并使地方政府参与土地价格竞争的意愿减弱。(3)拓展性分析发现,经济发展程度相近城市间工业用地价格竞争发生的条件是存在地理近邻联系或处于同一省级行政区划;同时,城市群批复对省内经济发展程度相近城市间工业用地价格竞争的缓解效应最大。本文认为将城市群批复权集中在中央政府是合理调节地方政府间竞争与合作激励的重要政策手段。
Price competition for industrial land transfers is a typical feature of horizontal competition among local governments in China.The implementation of the urban agglomerations’development strategy has adjusted the competitive incentives of local governments at the cross⁃administrative level and reshaped their industrial land granting behavior.This paper investigates the impact of urban agglomeration approvals on industrial land price competition using panel data from 2007 to 2020 for 281 prefecture⁃level and above cities across China.The results are as follows.(1)Benchmark regressions find that urban agglomeration approvals mitigate industrial land grant price competition among local governments under the geographic proximity setting,and the estimation results remain robust after changing the proxy variables,urban agglomeration approval time,and spatial weight matrix.(2)The path analysis finds that the administrative and market dividends generated by the urban agglomeration approvals can be manifested as a significant increase in the entropy of manufacturing lo⁃cations and the share of industrial enterprises in the urban agglomeration and a reduction in the willingness of local governments to engage in land price competition.(3)Expanded analysis reveals that the conditions for industrial land price competition among cities with similar economic development are the existence of geographical proximity or the same provincial administrative division;at the same time,urban agglomeration approvals have the greatest effect on mitigating industrial land price competition among cities with similar economic development in the province.This paper argues that centralizing the authority of urban cluster granting in the central government is an important policy tool to reasonably regulate the incentives of competition and cooperation among local governments.
作者
黄志基
石涛
贺灿飞
Huang Zhiji;Shi Tao;He Canfei(School of Government,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081;Hangzhou International Urbanology Research Center(Center for Urban Governance Studies),Hangzhou 311121;School of Urban Planning and Design,Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School,Shenzhen 518055;Social Laboratory of Urban Spatial Governance and Policy Simulation,Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School,Shenzhen 518055;School of Urban and Environmental Sciences,Peking University,Beijing 100871)
出处
《管理评论》
北大核心
2025年第5期17-29,共13页
Management Review
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(72274229,42171169)。
关键词
城市群
工业用地价格竞争
两区制空间杜宾模型
urban agglomeration
industrial land price competition
two⁃regime spatial panel Durbin model
