摘要
组建国有资本投资、运营公司是深化国有资本授权经营体制改革的核心举措。本文考察两类公司改革对国有企业纵向一体化的影响。本文以2011—2020年中国A股非金融行业上市公司为样本,基于各层级、各地区的两类公司改革构建双重差分模型,研究发现,两类公司改革提高了国有企业的纵向一体化水平。这是降低内部协调成本和外部交易成本综合作用的结果,企业内部协调成本越高、外部交易成本越低,两类公司改革对企业纵向一体化的影响作用越强。异质性分析表明,对于进行纵向并购的企业、政府重点扶持的产业的企业和产业聚集度较高地区的企业,以及实际控制人的股权控制链条越短、资金实力越弱的企业,两类公司改革对国有企业纵向一体化的影响作用越强,且在不同定位、层级和设立方式的两类公司中存在一定差异。进一步研究发现,两类公司改革在提高国有企业纵向一体化水平基础上提高了国有企业的全要素生产率和经济增加值。本文为两类公司改革成效提供了经验证据,从纵向一体化的视角揭示了国有企业在产业发展中的作用,也为深化国资国企改革促进现代化产业体系发展提供了政策启示。
State-owned enterprises are an important vital of the national economy.To strengthen the development of owned enterprises,the report to the 2oth National Congress of the Communist Party of China formulates pivotal strategic directives for deepening the reform of state-owned capital and enterprises.Building upon this foundation,the Third Plenary Session of the 2Oth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China further clarifies the implement of deepening the reform of state capital investment and operation companies(Reform of Two Types of Companies,RTTCs).State-owned enterprises are the backbone of the modern industrial system,and further leveraging their role in promoting industrial development is one of the major tasks of comprehensively deepening the reform of the state-owned economy in the new era.Under conditions of heightened market uncertainty and institutional complexity,vertical integration emerges as a strategic governance mechanism to mitigate the uncertainty.By implementing vertical integration,state-owned enterprises consolidate upstream supply networks and downstream distribution channels,thereby enhancing their industrial control capacity and reinforcing their role as linchpins in modern industrial systems.The vertical integration strategy is a result from a trade-off between internal transaction costs within the firm and external transaction costs in the market.Previous research has found that the decision-making behavior of state-owned enterprises has undergone significant changes after the RTTCs,indicating that the reform is projected to exert a significant impact on the vertical integration of state-owned enterprises through its concurrent effects on endogenous intra-firm coordination costs and exogenous market transaction costs,which are key determinants in the Coase framework of firm boundary analysis.This leaves us a research gap that how the RTTCs will influence the vertical integration of state-owned enterprises.Theoretically,the RTTCs,on the one hand,can reduce internal coordination costs within state-owned enterprises by improving corporate governance and alleviating financing constraints,thereby enhancing state-owned enterprises'vertical integration.On the other hand,the reform may also reduce external transaction costs by weakening the policy burden on state-owned enterprises and mitigating information asymmetry,thereby lowering the level of vertical integration.The net effect of the RTTCs on the vertical integration depends on the relative strength of internal coordination costs mechanism and external transaction costs mechanism.Using a sample of Chinese A-share non-financial listed companies from 2011 to 2020 and constructing a Difference-in-Differences(DID)model based on the RTTCs across various levels and provinces,this paper empirically finds that the reform has increased the level of vertical integration in state-owned enterprises.This is a combined result of reducing both internal coordination costs and external transaction costs.The analytical examination of the underlying mechanism demonstrates that a higher level of internal coordination costs and a lower level of external transaction costs are associated with a stronger effect of the RTTCs.Heterogeneity research shows that the effect of the reform is stronger for state-owned enterprises engaging in vertical mergers and acquisitions,industries that are government policy supported,regions with higher industrial agglomeration,shorter equity control chains of actual controllers,and weaker financial capacity.Additionally,there are certain differences in the effect among the two types of companies with different orientations,levels,and establishment methods.Further research finds that the increase in vertical integration of state-owned enterprises resulting from the RTTCs can improve their total factor productivity and economic value added.This paper provides empirical evidence for the effectiveness of the RTTCs,shedding light on the role of state-owned enterprises in industrial development from the perspective of vertical integration.Informed by the theoretical implications of our analysis,this investigation yields critical policy implications for advancing the structural realignment of state-owned asset management systems and enterprise governance frameworks,thereby fostering the development of a modern industrial system.
作者
滕飞
吴楚仪
辛宇
TENG Fei;WU Chu-yi;XIN Yu(School of Marxism,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou,Guangdong,510275,China;Guangdong Province Research Center for Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,Guangzhou,Guangdong,510635,China;International Business School,Guangdong University of Finance&Economics,Foshan,Guangdong,528100,China;School of Business,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou,Guangdong,510275,China)
出处
《经济管理》
北大核心
2025年第5期87-107,共21页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
研究阐释党的二十届三中全会精神国家社会科学基金重大专项“国有经济布局优化和结构调整的机制创新与实现路径研究”(24ZDA010)。
关键词
国有资本授权经营
国有企业纵向一体化
交易成本
state-owned capital authorization and management
vertical integration of state-owned enterprises
transaction costs
