摘要
文章利用IPO时初始产权性质为民营的上市公司数据,考察“反向混改”程度对两类代理问题的影响。结果表明,“反向混改”能够显著降低第二类代理成本,但对第一类代理成本没有明显降低作用,甚至有较弱证据表明,“反向混改”会提高第一类代理成本。异质性检验表明,当公司外部治理和所在地区制度环境较差及不存在政治关联时,“反向混改”才对第二类代理成本具有显著抑制作用。此外,上述作用主要来自非金融类机构持股。这一研究提供了国有资本介入对民营企业代理问题影响的经验证据,从而有助于了解“反向混改”的治理效应。
Using data from A-share nonfinancial listed companies that were privately controlled at the time of IPO,this paper explores the impact of“reverse mixed reform”on two types of agency problems in private enterprises.The results show that state-owned capital can significantly reduce type II agency costs,but the authors find no evidence supporting the negative effect of state-owned capital on type I agency costs.There is weak evidence suggesting that“reverse mixed-ownership reform”will aggravate typeⅠagency problems.The results of heterogeneity tests show that the negative effect of“reverse mixed-ownership reform”on typeⅡagency costs only exists when the external governance and regional institutional environment are poor,and that the effect is not significant in politically connected enterprises.Additionally,the effect of state-owned capital on agency costs mainly comes from the shareholding of non-financial institutions.This study provides empirical evidence on the effect of state-owned capital intervention on two types of agency problems in private enterprises,helping to understand the governance effect of“reverse mixed-ownership reform”.
作者
李明辉
刘笑霞
LI Minghui;LIU Xiaoxia(Business School,Nanjing University,Nanjing,210093;School of Economics&Management,Nanjing University of Science&Technology,Nanjing,210094)
出处
《中国经济问题》
北大核心
2025年第2期100-115,共16页
China Economic Studies
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目(21BGL011)。
关键词
反向混改
治理效应
代理成本
民营企业
reverse mixed-ownership reform
governance effect
agency cost
private companies
