摘要
笛卡尔在第一哲学中对“实体”作了两种解释:“独立实体”与“主体实体”。前者表示“实体”是不依赖他物的独立存在,后者则表示“实体”是属性所寓居的主体。然而,两种解释间无法调和,产生了诸多争论。两种解释均肯定“实体”具有本体论的地位,这又牵扯出第三属性问题。笛卡尔承认身心结合体的属性是第三种原初概念,这与仅有两种有限“实体”的说法相悖。近来流行的自然主义解释质疑“实体”的本体论地位,倡导笛卡尔早期的界定,即“实体”仅等同于“物”或“东西”。这种解释化解了以上争论,同时也破除了笛卡尔“实体二元论”的传统观点。在此基础上,“属性三元论”与“实体三元论”的观点同时遭到破除,“属性二元论”成为解读笛卡尔思想的新动向。
Descartes gave two definitions of“substance”in the first philosophy:“independent substance”and“subject substance”.The former means that a“substance”is an independent existence that does not rely on other things,while the latter means that a“substance”is the subject in which properties inhere.However,the two interpretations cannot be reconciled,which results in many disputes.Both interpretations affirm substance’s ontological primacy,which in turn raises the problem of the third property.Descartes acknowledges that the property of the body-mind combination constitutes the third common notion,which contradicts the statement that there are only two finite substances.The newly popular naturalistic interpretation challenges the ontological status of“substance”and advocates Descartes’early definition,that is,“substance”has no ontological meaning and is only equivalent to“things”.This interpretation not only resolves the above disputes,but also breaks Descartes’traditional view of“substance dualism”.With the fading of its ontological meaning,the assertions of“property trialism”and“substance trialism”have all been refuted.On the contrary,“property dualism”has become a new trend in interpreting Descartes.
作者
陈露航
CHEN Luhang(Department of Philosophy,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210023,China)
出处
《宁波大学学报(人文科学版)》
2025年第4期51-60,共10页
Journal of Ningbo University:Liberal Arts Edition
基金
国家社会科学基金重点课题“奥古斯丁和康德自由意志理论比较及其当代意义”(21AZX009)。
关键词
笛卡尔
独立实体
主体实体
物
第三属性
Descartes
independent substance
subject substance
things
the third property
