摘要
Information plays a crucial role in guiding behavioral decisions during public health emergencies. Individuals communicate to acquire relevant knowledge about an epidemic, which influences their decisions to adopt protective measures.However, whether to disseminate specific information is also a behavioral decision. In light of this understanding, we develop a coupled information–vaccination–epidemic model to depict these co-evolutionary dynamics in a three-layer network. Negative information dissemination and vaccination are treated as separate decision-making processes. We then examine the combined effects of herd and risk motives on information dissemination and vaccination decisions through the lens of game theory. The microscopic Markov chain approach(MMCA) is used to describe the dynamic process and to derive the epidemic threshold. Simulation results indicate that increasing the cost of negative information dissemination and providing timely clarification can effectively control the epidemic. Furthermore, a phenomenon of diminishing marginal utility is observed as the cost of dissemination increases, suggesting that authorities do not need to overinvest in suppressing negative information. Conversely, reducing the cost of vaccination and increasing vaccine efficacy emerge as more effective strategies for outbreak control. In addition, we find that the scale of the epidemic is greater when the herd motive dominates behavioral decision-making. In conclusion, this study provides a new perspective for understanding the complexity of epidemic spreading by starting with the construction of different behavioral decisions.
基金
Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 72174121)
the Program for Professor of Special Appointment (Eastern Scholar) at Shanghai Institutions of Higher Learning, and the Soft Science Research Project of Shanghai (Grant No. 22692112600)。
