摘要
针对双渠道供应链中存在的推广成本信息不对称问题,本研究考虑制造商拥有推广成本信息并可决策是否向零售商共享,构建了动态博弈模型,分析了推广成本和信息共享对供应链成员定价决策的影响,通过比较推广前后制造商的最优利润决定制造商是否进行推广。研究表明:只有高成本推广的制造商才有谎报信息的动机;当市场处于推广成本较小且价格敏感系数较大的环境中,制造商实施推广策略收益更大,并且随着市场潜在需求的增加,制造商实施推广的有效范围相应扩大;制造商实施推广策略有助于扩大总体市场需求,提高供应链的总利润。
In addressing the challenge of asymmetrical information concerning promotion cost within dualchannel supply chain,we consider the scenario where manufacturers possess information on promotional costs and can make decisions regarding whether to share this information with retailers.To delve into the implications of promotional costs and information sharing on pricing decisions among supply chain members,we formulate a dynamic game model.By conducting a comparative analysis of optimal profits for manufacturers before and after the implementation of promotional strategies,the decision to engage in promotion is determined.The findings of the study reveal that only manufacturers facing high-cost promotions are incentivized to manipulate information.In circumstances where promotional costs are relatively low and the price sensitivity coefficient is high,manufacturers experience greater benefits from adopting promotional strategies.Moreover,as potential market demand increases,the viable scope for manufacturers implementing promotion expands proportionately.The implementation of promotional strategies by manufacturers serves to amplify the aggregate market demand and enhance the total profit of the supply chain.
作者
刘敏
李豪
LIU Min;LI Hao(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,400074,Chongqing,China;Western China Transportation-Economy-Society Development Study Center,Chongqing Jiaotong University,400074,Chongqing,China)
出处
《特区经济》
2025年第5期110-114,共5页
Special Zone Economy
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“共建共治共享背景下网约车市场治理的多方联动机制研究”(19XGL016)。
关键词
双渠道供应链
推广成本
信息不对称
溢出效应
Dual-Channel Supply Chain
Information Asymmetry
Promotion Cost
Spillover Effect
