摘要
《民法典》颁布以来,有关第10条(“习惯入典”条款)中的习惯是否等同于习惯法、习惯可否作为法源学界观点不一。对于前一个问题,经过逻辑演绎与修辞论证发现“习惯入典”条款中的习惯仅具有“事实之习惯”要素,难以满足“法的确信”要素;行为之习惯与规则之习惯有效区分了习惯与习惯法;基于国家立场的“国家认可说”混同了习惯与习惯法的概念,从法的性质、概念范畴及研究场域等维度都发现“习惯入典”条款的习惯不应当被认定为习惯法。对于后一个问题,不同立场的学者对于“习惯入典”条款中习惯是否属于法源存在大相径庭的看法。应当采取法理论的观点,认定“习惯入典”条款中的习惯并非确立了习惯的法源地位,仅是作为制定法的适用规则。具体来说,“习惯入典”条款补足了司法机关在处理民事纠纷时适用习惯的更强正当性,确认了习惯为我国司法适用的依据。
Since the promulgation of the“Civil Code of the People's Republic of China”,there have been different opinions in the academic circles about whether the custom in Article 10(“custom into the Civil Code”clause)is equivalent to customary law and whether it can be used as a source of law.For the former question,after logical deduction and rhetorical argumentation,it is found that the custom in the clause of“custom into the Civil Code”only has the element of“factual customs”,which is difficult to satisfy the element of“opinio juris”.The custom of behavior and the custom of rules effectively distinguish between custom and customary law;Based on the position of the state,the“theory of national recognition”mixes the concepts of custom and customary law,and it is found that the custom of the“custom into the Civil Code”clause should not be recognized as customary law from the dimensions of the nature,conceptual scope and research field of the law.On the latter question,scholars of different positions have very different views on whether custom is a source of law in the“custom into the Civil Code”clause.According to the view of legal theory,the custom in the clause of“custom into the Civil Code”does not establish the status of customary law,but only serves as the applicable rule of the statute.Specifically,“custom into the Civil Code”clause complements the stronger legitimacy of the application of customs by judicial organs in handling civil disputes,and confirms that custom is the basis for judicial application in China.
出处
《民间法》
2024年第3期180-202,共23页
关键词
“习惯入典”条款
法的确信
习惯
习惯法
法源
“custom into the Civil Code”clause
opinio juris
custom
customary law
source of law
