摘要
环境规制是中国生态文明建设的重要手段,但环境规制能否引导企业充分考虑生态环境可承载性的同时兼顾社会责任和治理责任尚无定论。本文利用2010一2020年中国A股重污染行业上市公司样本,实证考察环境规制对企业绿色治理的作用,并检验了环保压力和代理问题两种影响机制。研究发现:环境规制与企业绿色治理机会主义行为之间呈现出正相关关系。机制检验表明,环境规制增大了企业的环保压力和代理问题。异质性分析显示,环境规制对企业绿色治理机会主义行为的作用只在高媒体关注、低政府与市场的关系、高融资约束和国有企业样本中显著。因此,政府在制定和颁布环境规制政策时,应纳入社会绩效和治理绩效考核,避免部分企业出现“顾此失彼”的绿色治理机会主义行为。本文不仅拓宽绿色治理理论框架,还为环境规制的经济后果研究提供新的视角。
Typically,companies prioritize achieving commercial value,assuming governance responsibilities,and then taking on social and environmental responsibilities.However,under strong environmental regulatory pressure,companies may change the order in which they assume responsibilities to various stakeholders.This can lead to some companies failing to balance the interests of diverse stakeholders while fulfilling their environmental responsibilities,resulting in a disconnect between human and natural development and presenting a phenomenon of green governance opportunistic behavior.This phenomenon is essentially an opportunistic behavior by companies in response to external environmental pressures,undermining stakeholders'confidence in green products and environmentally friendly companies,and hindering the achievement of sustainable development.Therefore,does environmental regulation lead to green governance opportunistic behavior?If so,what are the influencing mechanisms?From the perspective of institutional theory,this paper uses a sample of listed companies in heavily polluting industries on China's A-shares from 2010 to 2020 to empirically examine the effect of environmental regulation on green governance opportunistic behavior.In terms of variable measurement,this paper evaluates companies'responsibilities based on their environmental responsibility scores,social responsibility scores,and shareholder responsibility scores,thereby synthesizing a green governance opportunistic behavior variable.Specifically,using industry comparability within the same responsibility scores,the three responsibility scores are converted into three dummy variables,each representing whether the respective responsibility is well-fulfilled.Samples where environmental responsibility is well-fulfilled but social or shareholder responsibilities are poorly fulfilled are defined as green governance opportunistic behavior.This method of variable measurement avoids the issue of inconsistent dimensions and standards among the three responsibility scores,resulting in more reliable research conclusions.The research result shows that environmental regulation significantly promotes the occurrence of green governance opportunistic behavior in companies,indicating that environmental regulation,as a mandatory institutional measure,has triggered the phenomenon of companies"attending to one thing and losing another"in green governance.Mechanism tests reveal that environmental regulation increases companies'environmental pressures and agency problems.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the effect of environmental regulation on green governance opportunistic behavior is significant only in samples with high media attention,poor government-market relations,high financing constraints,and state-owned enterprises.The above research conclusions indicate that environmental regulation can trigger green governance opportunistic behavior in companies,and this relationship is more pronounced under greater environmental pressure and more severeagency problems.This paper studies the impact of environmental regulation on green governance opportunistic behavior and analyzes the influencing mechanisms and the moderating role of internal and external environments.Firstly,combining real-world context and related research,this paper proposes the concept of green governance opportunistic behavior,expanding the scope of research related to green governance.Secondly,by using industry comparability within the same dimension,this paper constructs a measurement variable for green governance opportunistic behavior,improving the evaluation method of companies'green governance performance.Thirdly,the paper finds that environmental regulation may induce green governance opportunistic behavior in companies,revealing the latent impact of environmental regulation and,to a certain extent,clarifying the influencing mechanisms and moderating roles of internal and external factors on green governance opportunistic behavior.This helps deepen the understanding of the economic consequences of environmental regulation.
作者
李维安
李鼎
周宁
LI Wei-an;LI Ding;ZHOU Ning(School of Business Administration,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Liaoning,Dalian,116025,China;China Academy of Corporate Governance,Nankai University,Tianjin,300071,China)
出处
《经济管理》
北大核心
2025年第1期5-23,共19页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“突发事件应急社会治理的协同机制研究”(72174096)
国家社会科学基金重大项目“新《公司法》下国有企业现代公司治理理论与实践问题研究”(24&ZD084)。
关键词
环境规制
绿色治理
机会主义行为
环保压力
代理问题
environmental regulation
green governance
opportunistic behavior
environmental pressure
agency problem
