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绩效报酬影响创造力的短期效应与长期效应“悖论” 被引量:1

The paradox between the short-term and long-term effects of pay for performance on creativity
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摘要 塑造并引导个体着眼长远的激励体系是当前推进科技自强亟待破解的理论难题。现有研究多以横截面研究为主,忽视了动态视角下的时间效应。鉴于绩效报酬激励体系在激发创造力的过程中产生的两种目标导向:着眼于当下追求短期价值的表现目标导向(PGO)和着眼于学习发展寻求长期价值的精熟目标导向(MGO)。而目标的选择取决于基于时间折扣的利弊权衡“算计思维”。据此,基于时间动机理论,本文构建了一个有关绩效激励的时间动机模型,并据此设计两项研究,旨在探索考虑时间折扣影响下的短期和长期绩效报酬如何影响个体目标导向的选择进而决定其创造力。研究1的横截面研究揭示,短期内,绩效报酬强度促进个体趋近PGO远离MGO,从而负向预测创造力。研究2通过纵向的潜变量增长模型和HLM模型结果揭示,长期内,绩效报酬强度促进个体趋近MGO远离PGO,从而正向预测创造力。研究揭示了绩效报酬激励效应的时间变化轨迹和目标导向逆转现象,即随着时间的推移,绩效报酬制度引导员工逐渐从趋近PGO远离MGO,转向趋近MGO远离PGO,从而形成一个长短期“悖论”:绩效报酬制度在短期内抑制创造力而在长期内促进创造力。本文的贡献在于创建了一个时间心理计量框架,为完善以绩效报酬为核心的激励制度提供了理论和管理启示。 The expected utility of employee actions depends not only on the trade-off of gains and losses,but also on whether the expected results occur now or in the future.For example,when it comes to wages just received,in relation to the question of whether they are used for immediate consumption or deposit,it is obvious that the value brought by the latter is greater,but with the consideration that this can only be achieved in the long term.Therefore,individual goal selection must be influenced by time discount.In the process of stimulating employees′ creativity,pay for performance tends to produce two kinds of goal orientation.The first one is performance goal orientation(PGO),which focuses on the present and pursues short-term high performance.It reflects the tendency of individuals to use their existing abilities to achieve immediate and profitable achievements,but this may inhibit their creativity in the short term.The second one is mastery goal orientation(MGO),which focuses on learning and pursues long-term high performance.It reflects an individual′s tendency to refine and develop learning skills to achieve higher performance in the future,which may enhance creativity in the long term.An individual′s choice of achievement goal orientations tends to change over time.Based on temporal motivation theory,this research constructs a multi-mediation model from the perspective of time to explore whether employees′ choice of achievement goal orientations is affected by temporal frames under the pay for performance system.In this research,two studies are designed to explore the influence of the pay for performance incentive effect on employees′ goal orientation choices under the effect of temporal frames.Study 1 explores the short-term effect relationship between variables based on cross-sectional data and conducts a questionnaire survey amongst employees from five high-tech enterprises in Shanghai.To reduce the effects of common method biases and causal lag effect,data collection was conducted in two stages with a two-week interval,through which 304 valid employee samples were finally obtained.The hypothesis testing revealed several results.1) The intensity of pay for performance negatively predicts PGO and positively predicts MGO.2) In the short term,the intensity of pay for performance has a negative effect on employees′ creativity by weakening MGO.Longitudinal study 2 uses latent growth modelling and hierarchical linear model to explore its long-term effect.We conducted a field survey in a large financial institution in Shanghai and selected 30 employee samples to track the questionnaire data for 10 months.Through the analysis of the questionnaire data via latent growth modelling,several results are obtained.First,with the change of time,the intensity of pay for performance positively predicts the change of MGO intercept(the initial value of MGO) and negatively predicts the rising speed of MGO.The analysis results of hierarchical linear model analysis indicate that MGO plays a mediating role between pay for performance and creativity,which means that the path of “the intensity of pay for performance(+) → MGO(+) → employee creativity” exists.Combined with the analysis results of the two methods,it can be seen that the intensity of pay for performance has a positive effect on employee creativity by strengthening MGO in the long term.Unlike previous studies,this study reveals the paradox of goal orientation choice wherein pay for performance affects employees′creativity in the long and short term.This means that with the passage of time,the pay for performance system guides employees to gradually shift from approaching PGO and away from MGO to approaching MGO and away from PGO,so as to inhibit creativity in the short term and promote creativity in the long term.Second,the results show that the temporal frame of tasks is the main information basis through which employees decide whether to use their existing ability to enjoy benefits in the short term or to enhance their ability to obtain long-term development benefits.Third,based on the fact that employees′ time and energy are limited resources,this study creates an overall explanation mechanism for the effect of different time frames on employees′ choices of different goal orientations under the pay for performance system.This paper provides the following management inspirations for improving the incentive effectiveness of performance compensation.On the one hand,organizations should reasonably set the intensity of pay for performance according to the time frame of innovation tasks and create relatively loose self-spaces and task environments for employees.On the other hand,managers should also formulate long-or short-term-oriented incentive mechanisms according to the actual situation and adjust the goal-oriented state of employees.
作者 马君 朱梦霆 闫嘉妮 MA Jun;ZHU Mengting;YAN Jiani(School of Management,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China;Antai College of Economics and Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China)
出处 《管理工程学报》 北大核心 2025年第1期63-77,共15页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71872111)。
关键词 绩效报酬 创造力 时间动机理论 成就目标导向 时间心理计量框架 Pay for performance Creativity Temporal motivation theory Achievement goal orientation Time-sensitive psychometric framework
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