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人工智能刑事主体资格的否定与思考

Negative and reflection on the qualification of artificial intelligence as a criminal subject
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摘要 随着人工智能产品智能性和拟人化程度的增强,部分学者提出赋予其刑事主体资格以应对其从事危害行为后的刑事归责难题。提出该主张的学者大多根据现有人工智能发展进行推断,缺乏在人工智能技术原理层面的考量。文章研究分析,现有的人工智能技术方案决定其无法产生类似人类的自我意识,不存在具备刑事主体资格的根基。同时从刑法教义学视角进行分析,可对赋予人工智能刑事主体资格的论断进行否定。 As the intelligence and anthropomorphism of artificial intelligence products increase,some scholars have proposed giving them criminal subject qualifications to deal with the problem of criminal liability after they engage in harmful behaviors.Most of the scholars who made this claim made inferences based on the existing development of artificial intelligence,and lacked consideration at the level of artificial intelligence technology principles.This paper research and analysis,existing artificial intelligence technology solutions determine that it cannot produce human-like self-awareness,and there is no basis for qualifying as a criminal subject.At the same time,analysis from multiple perspectives of criminal law doctrine and warning of the advent of the era of super artificial intelligence can negate the conclusion that artificial intelligence is a criminal subject.
作者 刘康迪 Liu Kangdi(People's Public Security University of China,Beijing,100038)
出处 《市场周刊》 2024年第5期156-161,178,共7页 Market Weekly
关键词 人工智能 刑事主体资格 技术原理 算法模型 刑法教义学 自动驾驶 artificial intelligence criminal subject qualification technical principle algorithm model criminal law dogma autonomous driving
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