摘要
人工智能法律主体资格的争论由来已久,大体可以归为肯定说、否定说和折中说三类。参考自然人与法人的赋权逻辑,人工智能未能发展出社会学意义上的理性意识,也无法像法人一般产生社会价值,因而不具备成为法律主体资格的可能性。人工智能迥异于传统民法体系中的物,应当明晰其适格的法律定位,特殊物格便是其中颇为值得关注的思路。可以从对人工智能进行类型化区分,通过构思人工智能归责机制,明确人工智能设计者、使用者甚至人工智能自身的责任分配方面进行路径规制。
The debate on the legal status of AI has a long history,which can be broadly classified into three categories:affirmative,negative and compromise.Referring to the empowerment logic of natural persons and legal persons,AI has not developed rational consciousness in the sociological sense,nor can it generate social value like legal persons,so it should not be granted the status of legal subject.In addition,AI is totally different from the“objects”in the traditional Civil Law,thus,its legal status should be further clarified.Among the many ways to determine the legal status of AI,the special qualification provides a good idea.In this paper,it’s argued that AI can be regulated from the aspects of classifying AI and attributing the respective responsibilities of AI designers,users,and AI itself through constructing a responsibility attribution mechanism.
作者
黄绍敏
Huang Shaomin(Law School of Guangxi University,Nanning 230004)
出处
《中阿科技论坛（中英文）》
2022年第12期177-182,共6页
China-Arab States Science and Technology Forum
基金
国家社科基金项目“分解式法学范式对中国特色社会主义法治体系的影响研究”(21BFX001)。
关键词
人工智能
法律主体
特殊物格
责任分配
Artificial intelligence
Legal subject
Special qualification
Attribution of responsibilities
