摘要
法定代表人制度作为一项极具特色的制度安排,规定由单一自然人对外代表企业从事民事活动并承担个人法律责任。本文以2006~2020年A股民营上市公司为样本,检验了经理人法定代表人身份对其薪酬契约设计的影响。研究发现,经理人担任公司的法定代表人,薪酬水平更高,薪酬业绩敏感性更低。异质性检验发现,当经理人为外部空降、企业前期有诉讼记录、对外提供担保、经营风险加剧时,经理人担任法定代表人的薪酬业绩敏感性更低。进一步研究发现,法定代表人身份对薪酬风险补偿的影响主要存在于董事长和经理人两职分离的情况下,法定代表人身份使其更倾向于购买董事高管责任保险。本文的研究结论丰富了经理人薪酬契约设计的影响因素,验证了法定代表人制度下公司层面的应对逻辑,为我国完善经济高质量发展的配套建设提供了新的思路。
As a highly characteristic system,the system of statutory representative stipulates that a single natural person shall represent the company in civil activities and undertake the personal legal liability.Using samples of A-share private listed companies from 2006 to 2020,this study investigates the effect of the statutory representative status on executive compensation.We find that as the statutory representative,the executive receives more compensation and lower pay-performance sensitivity.Further analysis reveals that there is a more significant negative correlation between statutory representative status and executive pay-performance sensitivity when the executive is appointed from outside,the enterprise had litigation experience,external guarantee,and increased operational risk in the early stage.The influence of statutory representative status on risk offset of compensation mainly exists when the executive is not the chairman.The probability of purchasing directors'and officers'liability insurance is higher when the executive is the statutory representative.Our empirical evidence helps to enrich the influencing factors of executive compensation,verify the logic of corporate response to the statutory representative system,and provide a new idea for the supporting construction of high-quality economic development.
作者
董雅浩
邓博夫
吉利
DONG Ya-hao;DENG Bo-fu;JI Li
出处
《财务研究》
CSSCI
2022年第5期79-91,共13页
Finance Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71902161)
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(18YJA630041)。
关键词
法定代表人
薪酬契约
薪酬业绩敏感性
风险补偿
statutory representative
executive compensation
executive pay-performance sensitivity
risk offset
