摘要
从创意的不确定性出发,构建消费者与创业者的博弈模型,分析资金需求、创意可靠性对最优价格决策、功能选择、创业者利润及社会福利的影响,并收集京东科技型产品的众筹数据对众筹价格进行实证检验。研究表明,支持者数量与众筹价格和市场价格负相关,与产品创意可靠性正相关;资金需求低时,众筹应发挥分散创意风险的功能;资金需求较高时,众筹应发挥融资功能;资金需求过高时,创业者应放弃奖励型众筹,寻求其他融资渠道。
Starting from the uncertainty of creativity, this paper constructs a game model between consumers and entrepreneurs,analyzes the impact of capital demand and creative reliability on the optimal price decision, function selection, the entrepreneurs’ profits and social welfare, then collects the crowdfunding data of JD technology products for empirical test. It is shown that the number of supporters is negatively correlated with crowdfunding price and market price, and positively correlated with product creativity reliability. When the capital demand is low, crowdfunding should play the function of dispersing creative risk;when the capital demand is high, crowdfunding should play the financing function;when the capital demand is too high, entrepreneurs should give up reward-based crowdfunding and seek other financing channels.
作者
王文利
苏晓芳
杜静
郭姣
Wang Wenli;Su Xiaofang;Du Jing;Guo Jiao
出处
《投资研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第6期114-126,共13页
Review of Investment Studies
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(72171162)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(20YJC630148)。
关键词
奖励型众筹
创意风险
创意可靠性
价格决策
Reward-based crowdfunding
Creative risk
Creative reliability
Price decision
