摘要
针对政府如何选择合适的主体对生鲜供应链进行补贴的问题,本文在需求不确定环境下考虑公益性的影响,分别构建无政府补贴、补贴供应商、补贴销售商、补贴消费者四种情形的博弈模型,通过比较分析得到政府的最优补贴策略,以及对供应链最优决策的影响,最后结合数值算例进一步分析了公益性对不同补贴策略相对优势的影响。研究发现,当生鲜销售商通过平价或微利销售加强公益性时,这会对供应链各成员的盈利能力产生不同的促进作用,进而影响到补贴策略的选择。从改善社会整体福利的角度,当单位补贴较低时,政府对供应商实施补贴为最优策略;而当单位补贴较高时,政府对销售商和消费者实施补贴为最优策略,且两者的补贴效果相等。公益性与补贴资金杠杆率负相关,过多地加强公益性将降低财政补贴资金效率。
Fresh products are essential for people′s livelihoods.China′s Ministry of Commerce,together with relevant departments,has carried out the construction of public welfare agricultural product markets around“ensuring supply and stabilizing prices”.The purpose of the public welfare market is to“provide parity or low-profit public services and meet the requirements of public interests”and public welfare wholesale markets or public welfare retail markets are constructed in practice.However,fresh products are perishable and have a short life cycle.The supply is vulnerable to the effects of the external environment,as well as the randomness of market demand,aggravating the difficulty of supply chain operation of fresh products.Therefore,local governments need to invest certain special financial subsidy funds every year from the perspective of people′s livelihoods.However,at present,with a lack of specific guidance documents,local governments are not unified in the approach of subsidies,and the objects of subsidies are different.Three main forms of subsidies are currently used.First,the government subsidizes each unit of fresh products provided by suppliers to alleviate the production cost pressure of fresh suppliers.Second,for effectively promoting fresh food sellers to increase the sales of fresh products,the government subsidizes each unit of products sold by fresh sellers.Third,by adopting the policy of directly subsidizing consumers,the governments can effectively stimulate consumer demand or alleviate the pressure of rising prices.These subsidy strategies will lead to different financial leverage of special subsidy funds,resulting in diverse effects on the decision-making of the fresh supply chain.Furthermore,the supply of fresh products is important for the vital interests of citizens,so the government actively promotes the construction of public welfare agricultural product market system and encourages fresh suppliers or sellers to perform public welfare functions.Can fresh suppliers and sellers balance profitability and public welfare in the process of pursuing profits?How does public welfare affect the subsidy strategy?Does it affect the comparative advantages of different subsidy strategies?All of these practical problems need to be studied and solved urgently.In this context,for the supply chain consisting of a fresh supplier and a fresh seller,according to the characteristics of fresh products,the demand function affected by freshness,price and random factors is established.For solving the problem of how the government chooses the proper object to subsidize the fresh supply chain,we construct the game models of non-government,supplier,seller,and consumer subsidies,respectively.The government announces the subsidies in advance and will not participate in market decisions later.Decision order follows a Stackelberg game,in which the fresh supplier is the dominant player,and the fresh seller is the follower.To study the effect of public welfare on consumer surplus more directly,this paper focuses on the situation in which the fresh seller considers public welfare.Therefore,the fresh seller should not only pursue their profit but also take the consumer surplus into account.Through a comparative analysis of the above three subsidy strategies,we obtained the government′s optimal subsidy strategy and its effect on the optimal decision-making of the supply chain.Finally,a numerical example is provided to analyze the effect of public welfare on the relative advantage of different subsidy strategies further.The result indicates that the public welfare of fresh sellers affects their profitability,in which properly strengthening the public welfare will help to enhance the seller′s profitability.By contrast,excessive consideration of public welfare will weaken the seller′s profitability.Furthermore,subsidies to suppliers,sellers,and consumers can effectively stabilize prices,increase supply,and increase investment in fresh-keeping.Moreover,when the unit subsidy is low,subsidizing suppliers to improve the overall social welfare is most effective.By contrast,when the unit subsidy is high,the effect of subsidy to sellers and consumers to improve the overall social welfare is most significant,and the two incentive effects are the same.Finally,public welfare is negatively related with the leverage ratio of subsidy funds,and properly enhancing the public welfare of fresh sellers will help to improve the efficiency of subsidy funds.At the same time,strengthening the public welfare of fresh sellers will weaken the comparative advantage of subsidy strategies and accelerate the transformation of relative advantages between subsidy strategies.
作者
张旭梅
朱江华
但斌
刘墨林
马崧萱
ZHANG Xumei;ZHU Jianghua;DAN Bin;LIU Molin;MA Songxuan(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China;Chongqing Key Laboratory of Logistics at Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030,China;School of Management,Guizhou University of Commerce,Guiyang 550014,China)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第4期230-239,共10页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家社会科学基金重大资助项目(15ZDB169)。
关键词
生鲜农产品
政府补贴
公益性
供应链
不确定需求
Fresh products
Government subsidies
Public welfare
Supply chain
Uncertain demand
