摘要
选取2013—2020年沪深A股上市企业财务数据为研究样本,深入研究高管内部薪酬差距对企业研发操纵的影响,实证结论表明:(1)社会行为理论在薪酬差距过大的管理层中发挥作用,表现为高管内部薪酬差距加大了企业研发操纵程度;(2)机构投资者持股和国有产权性质对高管内部薪酬差距与研发操纵之间的正向关系产生显著的抑制作用;(3)进一步研究表明,高管内部薪酬差距可以通过削减研发支出提升企业业绩,验证了高管的自利动机。本文拓展了研发操纵的研究范畴,从高管内部薪酬差距视角探究了企业研发操纵的影响因素,为企业制订合适的薪酬契约提供了参考。
Using the financial data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2013 to 2020,this paper empirically investigated the effect of executive internal pay gap on R&D manipulation.Consistent with social comparison theory,a significant positive relation between the executive internal pay gap and the R&D manipulation was found,which illustrated that larger pay gap of executives led to more abnormal reductions in R&D manipulation. It was also found that the institutional investors’ shareholding and the nature of state ownership have a significant inhibiting effect on the positive relation between the executive internal pay gap and R&D manipulation. Further analysis demonstrated that reduction of R&D expenditure was a tool for executives to improve enterprise performance,verifying the executives’ self-interest motives. This paper explored the factors influencing firms’ R&D manipulation from the perspective of executive internal pay gap,expanding the scope of research on R&D manipulation and providing theoretical references for firms to establish reasonable incentive mechanisms on promoting innovative development.
作者
李鹏飞
熊紫钰
杜辰楠
乐权权
LI Peng-fei;XIONG Zi-yu;DU Chen-nan;LE Quan-quan(School of Economics and Management,China University of Geosciences,Wuhan 430074,Hubei,China)
出处
《国土资源科技管理》
2022年第3期96-109,共14页
Scientific and Technological Management of Land and Resources
关键词
高管内部薪酬差距
研发操纵
机构投资者
产权性质
executive internal pay gap
R&D manipulation
institutional investors
nature of property rights
