摘要
通过构建政府与建筑企业之间的演化博弈模型,研究了政府补贴与税收优惠对建筑企业安全创新行为的意愿分析,得到结论:建筑企业在开展安全创新活动前期,其安全创新行为意愿更倾向于使用已有的安全专利技术,且其安全创新行为意愿随着政府补贴力度的增大而增加,表明补贴政策更能促进建筑企业的安全创新意愿;建筑企业在开展安全创新活动中后期,即在使用已有安全专利技术一段时间后,其安全创新行为意愿更倾向于自主开展安全技术研发,且其安全创新行为意愿随着税收优惠力度的增大而增加,表明税收优惠更能促进建筑企业的安全创新行为意愿。该结论为政府提升建筑企业的安全创新行为意愿提供了支持。
By constructing an evolutionary game model between the government and construction enterprises,this paper studies the willingness of government subsidies and tax incentives on the safety innovation of construction enterprises,and draws the following conclusions:In the early stage of safety innovation activities,the safety innovation intention of construction enterprises is more inclined to use the existing safety patent technology,and the safety innovation intention increases with the increase of government subsidy intensity,indicating that the subsidy policy can promote the safety innovation intention of construction enterprises.In the middle and late stages of safety innovation activities,that is,after using the existing safety patented technology for a period of time,the willingness of safety innovation of construction enterprises is more inclined to independently carry out safety technology research and development,and the willingness of safety innovation increases with the increase of tax incentives,which indicates that tax incentives can better promote the willingness of construction enterprises to conduct safety innovation.The conclusion provides support for the government to improve the willingness of construction enterprises’safety innovation.
作者
仇国芳
马琳
QIU Guofang;MA Lin(School of Management,Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology,Xi’an 710055,China)
出处
《技术与创新管理》
2022年第2期162-168,共7页
Technology and Innovation Management
关键词
建筑企业
政府补贴
税收优惠
安全创新行为
博弈分析
construction enterprises
government subsidies
tax incentives
safety innovation
game analysis
