摘要
政府研发补贴应考虑社会效益。本文在企业融资约束和政企信息不对称情境下,基于机制设计分析框架,聚焦实践中常见的研发前补贴和研发后成本分担两种补贴方式,分别刻画不同方式下最大化社会效益的补贴机制,分析最优机制的结构特征及社会效益差异。主要得到了如下研究结论:第一,信息不对称情境下,最优机制应筛选虚拟创新剩余最大的企业作为补贴对象,补贴额度根据企业类型确定。第二,数值模拟结果显示:融资约束高时,研发前补贴机制可节省企业融资成本实现更高补贴效益;融资约束低时,研发后成本分担机制可节省政府信息成本实现更高补贴效益。第三,结合两种补贴方式优势的混合补贴机制具有效益增益。第四,竞争性补贴申报机制可实施最优机制,实现精准筛选补贴对象,精确设定补贴额度的效果。第五,信息不对称程度加大产生更高信息成本,对补贴造成更多"扭曲"。第六,技术研发成功率较低且技术研发溢出效应较高时,内生决定补贴企业数量的机制更优。本文研究丰富了中国情境下的创新政策设计理论,为我国研发补贴政策优化提供理论指引和实施方案。
R&D subsidy serves as an important policy instrument to implement innovation-driven development strategies.Subsidies for R&D of key industrial technologies with considerable amount of input,high risk and significant spillover effect can raise the overall output of the industrial chain and improve social welfare.Statistic data shows that during 2007—2015,nearly 22.3%of total social R&D investment was in the form of government subsidies in China.On the one hand,governmental R&D subsidies motivate technology firms’R&D investment and improve social welfare.On the other hand,the wrong selection of subsidy targets and inaccurate amount of subsidy are prevalent and lead to low social welfare of subsidies.Therefore,the study of how to design a feasible subsidy mechanism to screen out the right subsidy targets and to set the accurate subsidy amount to maximize the social welfare of subsidies has important practical significance.However,the existing literature has not systematically explored the issue of subsidy mechanism design in the context of coupling of financial constraint and information asymmetry.This paper adopts the standard mechanism-design approach introduced by Myerson(1981),considers two practically common subsidy modes,namely,pre-R&D subsidy and post-R&D cost sharing,to characterize the respective optimal subsidy mechanisms;it compares their performance difference in terms of social welfare,analyzes the impacts of technology firms’financial constraint and information asymmetry on the social welfare,and designs the optimal subsidy mechanism with the mixture of pre-R&D subsidy and post-R&D cost sharing to improve social welfare.This paper can provide theoretical guidance and implementation solution to optimize the R&D subsidy policy.The research results of this paper are as follows.(1)The pre-R&D subsidy has the advantage of decreasing financing cost of technology firms,while the post-R&D cost sharing mechanism can save the government’s information cost.(2)If the financial constraint of technology firms is low,then the post-R&D cost sharing mechanism outperforms the pre-R&D subsidy mechanism,and vice versa.(3)The optimal subsidy mechanism with the mixture of pre-R&D subsidy and post-R&D cost sharing,which effectively balances financing cost and information cost,can further improve social welfare.(4)A competitive subsidy tender mechanism can be constructed to implement the optimal mechanism by selecting the right subsidy target and providing its accurate amount of subsidy.The policy implications are as follows.(1)The government should fully consider the complex impact of coupling of firms’financial constraint and information asymmetry between the government and firms,adopt the reliable analysis framework of mechanism design to determine the appropriate subsidy mode and the optimal subsidy policy,in order to select the right subsidy targets and set accurate subsidy amount,thus enhancing the subsidy effect.(2)The subsidy policy should be dynamically adjusted to adapt to technology firms’financial conditions,and the subsidy mode and mechanism should be flexibly adopted to improve social welfare.(3)The government should improve the government-firm communication mechanism,and build a technology firm R&D database to acquire more R&D information,to mitigate the negative effect of information asymmetry on subsidy policy performance.The contributions are as follows.(1)This paper analyzes the subsidy policy design by the mechanism design approach,investigates the channel of how financial constraint and information asymmetry affect the social welfare of subsidies,and establishes the rules of subsidy targets selection and subsidy amount determination,to provide theoretical guidance for effectively solving the problems of wrong selection of subsidy targets and inaccurate subsidy amount.(2)This paper explores how the coupling of financial constraint and transfer mode influences the virtual surplus formula to extend the theory of mechanism design with contingent transfers,and characterizes the optimal mechanism with multidimensional private information or endogenous amount of subsidy targets to enrich the optimal mechanism design theory.(3)This paper provides theoretical foundations and implementation plans for the choice of subsidy mode and design of subsidy mechanism according to the actual information and financial conditions.
作者
赖烽辉
李善民
王大中
LAI Fenghui;LI Shanmin;WANG Dazhong(a:School of Business,Sun Yat-Sen University;School of Economics,Nanjing University)
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第11期48-66,共19页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目(16ZDA012)
教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目青年基金(19YJC790129)
广东省科技计划项目(2019B101001004)
广东省软科学研究计划项目(2018A070712017)的资助。
关键词
研发补贴
信息不对称
融资约束
最优机制设计
竞争性补贴
R&D Subsidy
Information Asymmetry
Financial Constraint
Optimal Mechanism Design
Competitive Subsidy
