摘要
不论是“减债”,还是“增权”,去杠杆政策都会提高股权集中度,这有助于实际控制人克服“搭便车”行为,抑制管理层的卸责行为,所以去杠杆政策可能会降低企业的财务风险。对此,基于2014—2019年我国A股上市公司数据,运用双重差分模型检验了去杠杆政策对公司财务风险的影响。结果显示,去杠杆政策能显著降低公司财务风险,尤其是对于非国有企业和在主板上市的企业而言,政策效应尤为显著。中介效应检验表明,股权集中度在政策效应中发挥了部分中介作用。因此,建议企业应在去杠杆进程中顺势而为,适度集中公司股权,借此降低财务风险。
Whether it is“reducing debt”or“increasing equity”,deleveraging policy would boost ownership concentration,which will help overcome the actual controller s free-riding behavior and restrain the management s shirking behavior.Therefore,deleveraging policy might reduce the financial risk of enterprises.Based on the relevant data of all A-share listed companies in China from 2014 to 2019,the DID model was used to test the impact of deleveraging policy on the financial risk of companies.The results indicates that deleveraging policy can significantly reduce the financial risks of companies,especially for non-state-owned enterprises and listed companies on the main board.The mediating effect test shows that ownership concentration plays a part of mediating role in the policy effect.Therefore,it is suggested that enterprises should moderately centralize the ownership of the company in the process of deleveraging so that the financial risk can be reduced.
作者
秦海林
孙疆奥
QIN Hailin;SUN Jiang'ao(School of Economics and Management,Tiangong University,Tianjin 300387,China)
出处
《南京审计大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第1期69-79,共11页
Journal of Nanjing Audit University
基金
天津市社会科学规划项目(TJYY13019,TJYY17010)。
关键词
去杠杆政策
财务风险
代理成本
股权集中度
公司治理结构
政策效应
deleveraging policies
financial risk
agency costs
degree of ownership concerntration
corporate governance structure
policy effect
