摘要
自《避免“所予的神话”》一文发表,麦克道威尔对其之前所持有的概念论进行了改造。他以直观内容代替命题内容,以此来回应非概念论者所提出的概念内容与知觉内容之间区分等方面的诘难。文章将从三个方面考察新概念论立场的自洽性及其对非概念论者诘难的回应:其一,知觉经验在何种意义上是概念化的;其二,其是否解决了非概念论者在知觉经验现象上的诘难;其三,在此情形中,知觉经验的认知角色应该如何理解。根据这三个方面的考察,可以说,麦克道威尔的新概念论作为一种状态概念论版本,避免了内容概念论遭遇的诸多诘难。
Since the publication of“Avoiding the Myth of the Given”,McDowell has reconstructed its previous conceptualism.He replaced the propositional content with the intuitional content to respond non-conceptualists’query about the distinction between conceptual content and perceptual content and other questions.This paper will examine the self-consistency of the position of new conceptualism and its response to the questioning from non-conceptualists in three aspects:first,in what sense is the perceptual content conceptualized?second,whether it solves non-conceptualists’problem on the phenomena of perceptual experience;third,how the cognitive role of perceptual experience should be understood in this situation.On the basis of these three aspects,it can be said that McDowell’s new conceptualism,as a version of state conceptualism,avoids many problems encountered by content conceptualism.
作者
姚小琴
YAO Xiao-qin(School of Philosophy,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China)
出处
《科学技术哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第6期47-52,共6页
Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology
关键词
麦克道威尔
知觉经验
直观内容
状态概念论
McDowell
perceptual experience
intuitional content
state conceptualism
