摘要
中共中央关于国企改革的《指导意见》提出国有企业建立健全职业经理人制度要以市场化选聘为突破口,实现经营管理者的内部培养和外部引进相结合。因此,国企总经理的变更与选用将更多地体现市场因素,实现企业的市场化经营。文章基于2011—2017年沪深A股国有上市公司的面板数据,实证检验总经理变更类型对国有企业业绩的影响。研究发现:从来源渠道和产生方式的交叉视角看,总经理变更类型中只有内部选聘显著改善了国企业绩。进一步将上市国企分类,发现总经理内部选聘与竞争类国企业绩正相关,与垄断类国企业绩无关。研究结果表明总经理的内部选聘发挥了内部人的熟悉度优势和市场化的激励作用,更有利于激发经理人能力,促进国企尤其是竞争类国企的业绩提升,为当前国企强调内部转换和市场化选聘经理人提供了实证依据。
The“guiding opinions”of the Communist Party of China(CPC)Central Committee on the reform of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)put forward that the establishment of professional manager system in SOEs should take market-oriented selection as the breakthrough.Therefore,the change of general managers in SOEs will reflect more market factors to realize market-oriented operation.This paper takes the objects of listed SOEs from 2011 to 2017 to test the impact of the turnover of general managers on the enterprises’performance.The results show that:from the cross perspective of sources and management of general managers,only the internal market-based selection of general managers is positively correlated with the performance of SOEs.After classifying the listed state-owned enterprises,we find that the internal market-oriented selection of general managers is positively related to the performance of competitive SOEs,but not to the performance of monopoly state-owned enterprises.The results show that the internal training and transformation of professional managers plays an important role in the state-owned enterprises.This paper also provides an empirical basis for emphasizing the internal transformation and the market-oriented selection of managers in SOEs.
作者
余澳
贾卓强
张伟科
YU Ao;JIA Zhuo-qiang;ZHANG Wei-ke(School of Economics,Sichuan University,Sichuan University,Chengdu,Sichuan 610065;School of Public Administration,Sichuan University,Chengdu,Sichuan 610065)
出处
《江南大学学报（人文社会科学版）》
2020年第6期112-124,共13页
Journal of Jiangnan University：Humanities & Social Sciences Edition
基金
四川大学中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(2018skzx-pt74)。
关键词
总经理变更类型
交叉视角
国企业绩
turnover type of general managers
cross perspective
the performance of SOEs
