摘要
交易成本理论认为,专用性投资是纵向一体化的主要动因,但是相关的研究结果却对此提出了质疑。通过构建关系契约激励下的供应商进行专用性投资模型,探讨了一类高度专用性投资导致非一体化的情形。结果表明:所有权安排影响了关系契约的治理效率,在非一体化条件下,关系契约可以更好的激励专用性投资。研究拓展了交易成本理论对于企业边界的认识,也为纵向一体化的分解提供了新的证据。
When asset specificity is high,transaction cost theory predicts that the firm will tend to utilize more integrated structures in order to minimize transaction costs.However,recent surveys suggest that higher levels of asset specificity need not always lead to vertical integration.The purpose of this paper is to uncover some of the factors driving firms to choose to remain separated,in the presence of high specificity.In the model,the firms adopt relational contracts and the supplier determine the levels of specific assets.The results show that when the degree of specific is high,relational contract in non-intergration is easier to achieve fist best.This study not only extends the understanding of the basic TCE framework,but also provides new evidence for the vertical disinregration.
作者
于茂荐
孙元欣
YU Mao-jian;SUN Yuan-xin(School of Business Administration,Shanghai University of Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China;School of Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China)
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第11期45-52,共8页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
上海高校青年教师培养资助计划(slg12012)
上海理工大学人文社会科学资助项目(13XSY12)。
关键词
关系契约
专用性投资
纵向一体化
relational contracts
specific assets
vertical integration
