摘要
非房地产企业受房价上涨的吸引投资于房地产业务,虽然能给企业带来业绩增长,但这使得企业业绩很难衡量高管的努力程度,业绩质量也不高,根据高管薪酬的最优契约理论,企业业绩在高管薪酬契约中的使用权重会被降低。基于中国35个大中城市的房价数据以及中国非房地产业的上市公司数据,研究发现:高房价显著降低了企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性,这一影响在高管薪酬契约有效性较高时更显著;以上结论在使用DID模型控制反向因果内生性问题后依然成立。
This paper argues that,in non-real estate businesses,high housing price attracts high investments by firms,which improve firms’performance;however,the performance is difficult to measure executives’effort,and its quality is also poor.According to optimal contract theory,the importance of firms’performance in executive compensation contracts will decline as well,indicating a decrease in executive pay-performance sensitivity.Using the house price data of 35 large-and medium-sized Chinese cities and of listed firms in China’s non-real estate industry,this study reveals that high housing price significantly reduces executive pay-performance sensitivity,particularly when the executive compensation contract is effective.The above findings are robust to difference-in-differences(DID)model.The paper is not only an important supplement to the research literature on executive pay-for-performance sensitivity,but more importantly,provides a new perspective to study the impact of house price on enterprises.
作者
张兴亮
温日光
ZHANG Xing-liang;WEN Ri-guang(School of Accounting,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing,Jiangsu 211815,China;School of Business,Shantou University,Shantou,Guangdong 515063,China)
出处
《贵州财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第6期20-28,共9页
Journal of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“基于高管递延薪酬设计视角的国有企业杠杆率研究”(19BGL063)。
关键词
房价
高管薪酬
企业业绩
薪酬业绩敏感性
housing prices
executive pay
enterprise performance
executive pay-performance sensitivity
