摘要
在中国式央地分权结构下,地方政府具有相当的自由裁量权,从而基于地方利益选择相互竞争还是合作,甚至竞次或者共谋。本文以地方政府为获取超额建设占用耕地指标而创立的土地发展权折抵交易政策为例,提出了经济层面地方合作乃至共谋可能性的假说,并借助1999—2008年间浙江省的土地折抵指标交易数据进行实证检验。结果发现,经济发展水平差距、资源禀赋差距和人缘网络关系显著影响地方政府间通过交易共谋超额建设占用耕地指标的概率。本文的研究为解释中国式分权化改革后地方政府行为的逻辑提供了新的视角和实证依据。
Under China’s central-local decentralization framework, local governments have considerable discretion to choose either competitive strategy or collusion strategy based on their own local interests. In this paper we discuss the livelihood of horizontal collusion between local governments and why they have colluded. Then we put forward the hypothesis of collusion and took advantage of a Tobit model to test the hypothesis based on the land rights trading data of Zhejiang Province from 1999 to 2008. We find that there have been three main causes led to horizontal collusion between local governments, namely, the gap in economic development level between local governments, the gap of resource endowment and local officials’ network. Our research provides a new perspective and empirical evidence to explain the logic of local government behavior after the Chinese-style decentralization reform.
作者
李学文
张蔚文
陈帅
XUEWEN LI;WEIWEN ZHANG;SHUAI CHEN(Zhejiang University)
出处
《经济学（季刊）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第3期797-824,共28页
China Economic Quarterly
基金
教育部人文社会科学青年基金(14YJCZH083)
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71603234
71703149)
国家留学基金委2017年访问学者项目(201706325012)
第56批中国博士后科学基金(2014M561783)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金和浙江省博士后基金(BSH1402044)的资助。
关键词
地方政府
制度创新
土地发展权交易
local government
institutional innovation
transferable land development rights
