摘要
尽管已有大多数研究认为财政透明对遏制腐败具有重要且积极的作用,但鲜有研究关注这种作用在不同条件和情境下存在的差异。本文基于委托代理理论,首先分析了财政透明遏制腐败的机制,进而详细阐释了影响财政透明发挥反腐功效的影响因素,最后采用2006~2016年中国省级面板数据,运用系统GMM分析方法,对此进行了实证检验。分析结果表明,财政透明确实有助于减少腐败,并且在互联网普及率越高、社会团体数量越多、审计问责力度越大时,财政透明对腐败的遏制作用越强。只有当公众能真正获取和理解政府信息,并能通过一定渠道对政府部门形成强有力的问责压力时,财政透明才能对腐败滥权行为产生有效遏制作用。
Although most studies have indicated that fiscal transparency plays an important and positive role in curbing corruption,few studies have ever explored whether this impact is different under different conditions.Based on principal-agent theory,this paper firstly explores the mechanism through which transparency can reduce corruption and the conditions under which this beneficial effect is more likely to materialize,and then empirically examines these based on Chinese provincial panel data during the 2006-2016 period and GMM method.The analysis results suggest that fiscal transparency reduces corruption significantly,and this effect is even stronger in settings with a higher degree of internet penetration,presence of social organizations,and audit accountability.Therefore,only when the public actually obtain and digest government information and have some instrument at hand to increase authorities′accountable pressure,fiscal transparency can deter corruption and the abuse of public power.
作者
杜亚斌
DU Yabin(School of Public Administration and Policy,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)
出处
《中南财经政法大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第5期82-91,159,共11页
Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
基金
中国人民大学中央高校建设世界一流大学(学科)和特色发展引导专项资金(2020053)。
关键词
财政透明
腐败
委托代理理论
审计问责
调节效应
Fiscal Transparency
Corruption
Principal-Agent Theory
Audit Accountability
Moderating Effect
