摘要
文中在考虑制造商和零售商都履行企业社会责任的条件下,建立了制造商主导、零售商跟随的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了供应链成员在集中决策、分散决策以及收益共享契约下的最优决策。然后,结合数值分析研究了收益共享系数以及企业社会责任需求弹性系数对供应链成员企业社会责任绩效和利润的影响。得出了当收益共享系数在一定范围内时,企业社会责任绩效和利润均高于分散决策下的水平,但无法达到集中决策下的水平等结论。
In this paper,we establish a Stackelberg game model in which the manufacturer leads and the retailer follows,considering that both the manufacturer and retailer fulfill their CSR,and study the optimal decision-making of supply chain members under centralized decision,decentralized decision and revenue sharing contract.Then this paper combined with numerical analysis studies the impact of revenue sharing coefficient and CSR demand coefficient on CSR performance and profit of supply chain members.It is found that when the revenue sharing coefficient is within a certain range,CSR performance and profit are higher than those under decentralized decision-making,but cannot reach the level under centralized decision-making.
作者
黄宇斐
庄品
HUANG Yu-fei;ZHUANG Pin(School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 210016,China)
出处
《物流工程与管理》
2020年第7期107-111,共5页
Logistics Engineering and Management
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助,No.NR2017002。
