摘要
本文回顾和考察了普特南对其构造的"缸中之脑"的怀疑论案例的处理方案,指出以语义外在主义路线将普特南反驳"缸中之脑"论述重构成证明"‘我们都是缸中之脑’的陈述总是(甚至必然是)假的"的哲学论证当中存在的相关缺陷。在此基础上,本文试图将普特南的相关分析论述解读成普特南将"缸中之脑"案例作为探讨知识本质的思想实验所带来的哲学方法论层面的两难困境,从而规避了传统对于普特南策略解读中的批评意见。在文章的最后部分,笔者评估了上述方法论策略的解读在当代知识论研究中的哲学意涵。
In this paper,I argue that the traditional,semantic-externalist interpretation of Putnam’s argument against the brains-in-a-vat skepticism faces some severe challenges.The externalist analysis of the self-refuting-ness is unsuccessful in an epistemological sense.Therefore,such an interpretation of Putnam’s argument fails to establish the conclusion that the statement that we are all brains in a vat is always(or even necessarily)false.Then,an alternative interpretation is explored,which suggests that the case of brains in a vat,as heuristic thought experiment in the studies of the nature of human knowledge,represents a methodological dilemma.In the last section of the paper,the suggested methodological interpretation is critically evaluated.
作者
李麒麟
LI Qilin(The Department of Philosophy,The Institute of Foreign Philosophy,Peking University,Beijing,100871)
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第6期48-55,共8页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家社科基金项目“无处不在的语境敏感性与意义研究”(项目编号:14CZX038)
外国哲学基地项目“规范性研究——当代西方哲学中的自然主义与反自然主义之争”(项目编号:16JJD720003)。
关键词
怀疑论
语义外在主义
思想实验
哲学方法论
Skepticism
Semantic externalism
Thought experiment
Philosophical methodology
