摘要
防范商誉暴雷的关键在于降低企业并购过程中的不合理溢价,因此厘清企业并购溢价的影响因素至关重要。针对并购溢价来源,从CEO声誉视角分析了CEO高声誉降低并购溢价的作用机理,选取2010-2018年我国A股上市公司并购交易数据进行实证分析。研究发现,CEO声誉可以有效降低企业并购溢价,但在高成长性的企业中CEO声誉对并购溢价的抑制作用被削弱;CEO声誉影响并购溢价的机制分析表明,高声誉的CEO能够提高内部控制质量进而降低并购溢价;高声誉的CEO还能够降低企业计提商誉减值损失的概率。
The key point to prevent the explosion of goodwill is to reduce the unreasonable premium in the process of M&A,so it is very important to clarify the influencing factors of M&A premium.For premium sources,this article firstly analyzes the mechanism of CEO’s high reputation reducing M&A premium from the perspective of CEO reputation,then uses the M&A data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2018 for empirical analysis.The result shows that CEO reputation can effectively reduce the enterprise merger premium;but in the high-growth enterprises,the CEO reputation’s restraining effect on M&A premium is weakened.The mechanism analysis of the influence of CEO reputation on M&A premium shows that the CEO with high reputation can improve the quality of internal control so as to reduce the M&A premium.It is found that the CEO with high reputation can reduce the probability of the impairment provision of goodwill.
作者
张莹
陈艳
ZHANG Ying;CHEN Yan(School of Accountancy,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China;China Internal Control Research Center,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics Dalian 116025,China)
出处
《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第4期64-81,共18页
Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
