摘要
以2004-2017年中国A股上市公司为样本,采用Fraser Institute发布的经济自由度指数,研究雇佣保护对企业并购决策和并购绩效的影响。研究发现,雇佣保护程度越高,企业并购可能性和并购规模越小,且这一关系在劳动密集度较高、受融资约束较大的企业中更强,表明雇佣保护通过降低并购整合收益和限制并购融资能力两种机制对企业并购决策产生影响。通过考察并购经济后果,发现严格的雇佣保护会阻碍全要素生产率的提高和并购利得的实现,进一步佐证了主要研究发现。
Using the samples of A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2016 and Economic Freedom Index constructed by Fraser Institute, this paper empirically studies the impact of employment protection on mergers and acquisitions(M&A) and performance. This paper finds that employment protection negatively affects the preference and M&A deal value. The negative correlation strengthens in enterprises with higher labor intensity or higher financial constraint. These findings suggest that employment protection affects M&A decisions by reducing the ability of M&A financing and integration. Through studying economic consequences, strengthening employment protection impedes the improvement of total factor productivity(TFP) by M&A and makes M&A gains difficult to get. These further supports the main research findings.
作者
宋思淼
刘淑莲
梁雯
SONG Simiao;LIU Shulian;LIANG Wen(School of Accounting,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian,Liaoning 116025,China;School of Accounting,Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou,Zhejiang 310018,China)
出处
《财经理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第2期69-76,共8页
The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(16CJY006)。
