摘要
如何解释城管领导容忍城管协管员滥用自由裁量权谋利?既有研究基于“街头官僚”、“委托-代理”、“庇护主义”难以解释该问题,本研究基于B市Z区城管协管员案例,揭示了城管领导容忍协管员以“权谋利”的逻辑,即“抓大放小”:当某项任务涉及城管领导的重要考核时被认为是“大事”,当某项任务不涉及城管领导的重要考核时被认为是“小事”,是否影响领导的重要考核成为“大”与“小”的边界,城管领导通过“放小”容忍城管协管员“以权谋利”,动员城管协管员全力以赴“抓大”。这源于作为制度边缘人的城管协管员激励的缺失,而“以权谋利”某种程度上弥补制度缺失导致的激励不足。为了推进城管工作,尤其是动员城管协管员全力以赴城管的重点工作,城管领导只能对城管协管员的“以权谋利”有限规制。
This paper aims to explain why"urban inspection superior officer tolerate profit-seeking behavior of inspectors by discretion abuse",based on a case study of urban inspector in Z district of B city.Based on the logic of"turn a blind eye",urban assistant inspector superior officer tolerate the assistant managers"seeking profits by abusing the discretion":When a task involves the important aspect of performance assessment of urban management leaders,the task is considered as"a major event";Otherwise,it is considered as"a minor event".Here,whether being included as important in leaders'performance assessment becomes the boundary between"big"and"small".In the Urban Management Bureau,"aborting the small"and tolerating the urban assistant managers'profit-seeking behavior",helps to mobilize the assistant inspectors to do their best to"grasp the big".This is because of the lack of incentive for urban management assistants,who are the marginal group in the system.To some extent,"seeking profits by abusing the discretion"makes up for the lack of incentive for urban management assistants caused by the institutional deficiencies.In order to promote the performance of urban management,especially to mobilize the assistant inspectors to give full play to the key work of urban management,the Urban Management Bureau can only limitedly regulate t urban assistant inspectors discretionabusing profit-seeking behavior.However,this study also has limitations that need to improve:First,this study could not include other actions of abusing discretion except for the ones focus on profit-seeking;Second,the case may have limited explanatory power in the developed areas.Meanwhile this study helps people to understand the most local-level assistant inspectors and contributes marginally to the governance modernization process.The innovation of the article lies in that theories on"street bureaucrats","principal-agent"and"clien-telism"are insufficient to explain the phenomenon that"urban management leaders tolerate the abuse of discretion for profit by urban management assistants",and put forward a governance logic of limited regulation on urban administration at grass-roots level.
作者
凌争
段司超
Ling Zheng;Duan Sichao(School of Public Policy and Management,Tsinghua University,Beijing,100084,China)
出处
《公共管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第1期59-69,170,171,共13页
Journal of Public Management
基金
清华大学“江村学者计划”。
关键词
城管协管员
抓大放小
以权谋利
城市治理
自由裁量权
Urban Management Assistant
Grasping the Big and Aborting the Small
Seeking Profits by Abusing the Discretion
Urban Management
Discretion
