摘要
企业间通过连锁股东形成的经济关联在资本市场中尤为常见,但学术界关于连锁股东对企业发展的影响仍然存在“治理协同”和“竞争合谋”的意见分歧。本文以企业的投资效率为研究视角,考察连锁股东对于企业行为的影响。研究发现:①在企业的投资活动中,连锁股东的影响主要体现为“竞争合谋”,并导致同行业企业出现投资不足;②行业集中度和地区市场分割加强了连锁股东的影响,而中国对外反倾销事件带来的市场机遇弱化了这一作用,说明取得合谋收益是连锁股东干预企业投资的根本原因;③向企业委派董事以及更少实施股权激励计划是两条潜在的作用渠道;④在非国有企业中,连锁股东对投资不足的影响更为明显,同时连锁股东引发的合谋行为减少了企业的固定资产、无形资产与并购投资,并降低了企业的市场价值。本文不仅丰富了连锁股东这一新兴学术前沿的学术认知,也为理解中国当前市场中企业的低效率投资活动提供了来自竞争合谋视角的新证据,对于决策部门针对性地制定促进企业投资、提高市场资源配置效率的政策方案具有很好的参考价值。
In the capital market,there is a common phenomenon that different enterprises share a Cross-Owner.There are two theories about the influence of Cross-Ownership on enterprises in the early literature,one is coordination in governance and the other is collusion in market.From the perspective of investment efficiency,this paper studies the impact of Cross-Ownership on corporate behavior.It is found that:①In the investment activities of enterprises,the influence of Cross-Ownership is mainly reflected in collusion,which leads to underinvestment;②Industry concentration and regional market segmentation strengthen the influence of Cross-Owners,and the market opportunity brought by China’s anti-dumping events weakens this role,which shows that obtaining collusive profits is the fundamental reason for Cross-Owners to intervene in corporate investment;③Appointing directors to enterprises and implementing less equity incentive plan are two potential channels for Cross-Owners to intervene in corporate investment;④The influence of Cross-Ownership on underinvestment is more obvious in state-owned enterprises and the collusion caused by Cross-Owners reduces the investment of fixed assets,intangible assets and M&A,and reduces the market value of enterprises.This paper enriches the literature of Cross-Ownership,expands the research of corporate investment,and has reference value for the authorities to formulate relevant policies.
作者
潘越
汤旭东
宁博
杨玲玲
PAN Yue;TANG Xu-dong;NING Bo;YANG Ling-ling(School of Economics of Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005,China;School of Management of Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005,China)
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第2期136-154,共19页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“婚姻、家庭与公司财务行为”（批准号71972160）
国家自然科学基金面上项目“宗族文化与公司财务行为：基于族谱与姓氏的研究”（批准号71772155）
国家自然科学基金面上项目“圈层文化与公司财务行为：基于方言视角的研究”（批准号71572158）
关键词
连锁股东
治理协同
竞争合谋
投资效率
cross-ownership
coordination in governance
collusion in market
investment efficiency
